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Abstract 
Studies of the European integration reveal that EU Council Presidency is an 
institution, whose vision of Europe defines and shapes  ongoing and future 
integration processes. In times of deadlocks, it is the Presidency that is 
expected to exhibit leadership and guide the integration process towards new 
goals (Elgström 2003: 1). In the thesis we shall try to find out whether there 
are variations in guidance, understood as performance and whether 
performance can be explained by cognitive-normative factors, such as attitude, 
roles, expectations, intention or reputation. 
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1 Introduction and Layout 
The volume of events that have taken place during the decades of the European 
integration make some researchers attribute the status of the Council presidency as 
“grown by default than by design”(Kirchner 1992:71).   Existing research on the 
Presidency of the European Union Council of Ministers (hereafter referred to as the EU 
Council Presidency or the Presidency) mainly focuses on discussing the causality of 
performance of a presidency by legitimately attributing the output to the initially 
embraced image or role and buttressed by the quality of execution of functions a 
presidency carries out during its six-month term, – functions, intrinsic to any 
presidency. Studies on Council presidencies (Renshaw: 2006, Kirchner: 1992, Wallace: 
2005, Tallberg: 2001, Metcalfe: 1998, etc.), however, indicate that presidency’s 
orientation towards the European integration in general and presidency’s government or 
elite perception or attitude towards integration in particular may play a role in the 
ultimate performance of the presidency. Perception “demarcation” has been widely 
noted in the 1980s and 1990s literature on the European integration, where, as examples 
mentioned are stark perception-and-attitude-based biases in the United Kingdom (UK) 
or Denmark and approach to the European integration. Although the 80s extravagance 
of the British “indecision, vacillation and anti-Europeanism”1 changed with the pro-
European labour government in 1997, the precedent had been established: perceptions 
and attitudes may influence the process and outcomes of the presidency. Our norms, 
goals, stereotypes, expectancies, culture, prior knowledge, affect, needs and other 
characteristics can all direct what we think we see (Moskowitz 2005: 37).  Self-
perception related, the hypothesis may be translated into a supposition that norms, 
expectancies and prior knowledge, affects and needs can direct what we think we are. 
Attitudinal and contextual aspects of perception with regard to the European Union 
(EU) presidency performance therefore may rest on an assumption that norms, goals, 
expectations, identity, etc. affect how presidencies think they perform. Self-images and 
roles embraced by the Presidency in fulfilling specific tasks testify to the validity of 
such hypotheses. The raw material of presidency perceptions includes behaviour: 
presidencies perform actions directed toward the European citizens (ibid.). As such, 
categorizations and inference on presidency performance can be drawn from the type of 
behaviour that a presidency emits as viewed by the Presidency itself or the public 
sphere embraced into the “others” observer cluster. Attributions and inferences drawn 
from both the presidency and the “others” will help verify the existing roles, described 
in the academic literature. Performance, in its turn, is looked upon as a dependent 
variable,- dependent on the adopted roles, norms and expectations - the subject we 
elaborate on later in the thesis. The cases of the German 2007 and French 2008 
presidencies are primarily linked to the images and identities of the countries holding 
the presidencies –Germany and France.  
                                                                                                                                               
 
1 T.Blair speech extract in I. Manners “The British Presidency of 1998. New Labour, new tone? in 
Elgström (ed.) pp.87-103, 2003, Routledge 
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1.1 Introduction into the Study 
The study is not focused on the functions of the presidency per se, but rather on how the 
tasks fulfilled by the Presidency are perceived to have helped or restrained presidency 
performance.  
  
The starting point, however, is the definition of major concepts used in the thesis: 
performance and perception.  The thesis further aims to employ constructivism and the 
concept of “logic of appropriateness” as a theoretical skeleton for making informed 
inferences on behaviour and expectations. I will use historical institutionalism to 
explain attitudinal variations towards the European integration based on history-
dependent values and ideas. The empirical part will include content analysis of the 
discourse in the German and French media, official presidency documentation and 
interviews to test the role categorization to be presented earlier in the thesis.  
 
1.1.1 Purpose of the Study 
The broader purpose of the thesis is to study German 2007 and French 2008 EU 
Presidencies. 
The narrower purpose is to study the presidencies as  decisive bodies in the EU 
architecture, their self-perceptions shaped by norms, identities, goals and expectations 
and ultimately behaviours as affected by both internal and external factors and 
investigate whether these  affect Presidency performance.  The thesis therefore seeks to 
slightly drift from the traditional approaches to the EU presidency research and ask a 
general question whether there is anything outside the traditional functions-based 
profile of the presidency that affects its performance? I will look at the presidency self-
perception and other’s perception as a causal link to the presidency performance 
without disregarding member state characteristics, context and external events (see 
Elgström 2002:8). 
1.1.2 Research focus and research questions 
The existing literature on EU Council presidencies describes a relatively traditional 
profile of the presidency comprising a number of established functions of administrator, 
coordinator, broker and a representative. In view of these tasks behaviour and 
performance may be shaped by self-perception. As such, the thesis aims to ask: 
  
1. What is performance and does performance involve perception 
causality? 
 
The main aim of this part of the thesis is, with the use of historical 
institutionalism and constructivism to try to establish whether norms, 
identities, expectations and roles of the country-in-office affect the 
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performance of the Presidency; to reveal whether perception factors like 
roles, attitudes, expectations can be causally linked to presidency 
performance. In answering this question we shall also attempt to find out 
whether there is a difference between government performance and 
Presidency performance. 
 
2. Do expectations cause Presidency roles? 
To look at the ‘others’ perspective on EU presidency I aim to find out 
what was expected of the German and French presidencies by their 
citizens and institutions affected by or involved in  presidency outcomes. I 
will largely rely on the data taken from Eurobarometer, but will also 
consult Presidencies’ Working Programmes for higher reliability. I will 
divide the chapter into sub-chapters to look at Presidency self-image and 
roles. 
 
3.  Is what you see what you get? 
This part seeks to address performance of the German 2007  and 
French 2008 Presidencies and the ideas they employed when formulated 
the agenda or conducted negotiations; and tries to find out whether 
performance exercised is related to these ideas  
 
4. What is the discourse on the performance of the German and French 
presidencies and do inferences  explain the causality "self-perception 
determines performance"? 
 
This will be the empirical part of the thesis that will rest on conducting 
the analysis of content taken   from the German and French media, 
Council presidency-published resources, interviews with German  and 
French government officials (high-rank diplomats) and non-governmental 
organizations. The offered framework is based on Kimberly Neuendorf’s 
Flowchart for the Process of Content Analysis Research. 
1.1.3 Structure of the presentation 
The structure and presentation of the thesis follows the scheme and seeks to 
introduce the topic, inquire into the purpose of the thesis, reveal the research 
questions under study, make a revision of the relevant literature, undertake 
empirical investigation, make a general analysis of the findings and make a 
conclusion. Based on the theoretically-informed definitions of self-perception and 
performance given further, we shall follow a scheme (see below) that introduces 
self-perception and performance as actors to be able to describe and analyse their 
behaviour as well as establish a causal link between self-perception and 
performance. 
 
The scheme of the presentation will look as follows: 
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expectations 
      roles 
functions 
Scheme 1. Integrated model for self-perception –performance causality  
 
   
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
1.2. Theory and Definitions 
 
 Theoretical discourse on the EU Council Presidency extends to 
academic investigation of nearly all aspects  of Presidency operations 
(functions): brokering, decision-making, agenda-setting, bargaining, etc.  
These tasks are emblematic of the multi-faceted nature of the Council 
Presidency and its substantive contribution to the various theoretical 
discourses.  Functions of the presidency allow us to employ two main 
schools of thought, which mainly inform us of the attitudinal variations in 
the French and German presidency behaviours. These are: historical 
institutionalism and constructivism.  
1.2.1. Self-perception 
In assessing self-perception impact on a country’s Presidency 
performance, it is important to establish what we mean by “self” and 
“perception”, i.e. what is perception and who or what is the referent subject 
of perception.  Behaviourists approach perception through a template of 
“exact sciences” and claim that “both the physicist and the chemist are 
interested in knowing how a system, which they are investigating will react 
when exposed to a certain set of conditions; they also ask how the reaction 
of the system will change with a variation of those conditions (see Köhler in 
Moskowitz 2005: 13). It would therefore be plausible to look at perception 
as behaviour. As such, in the process of “pursuit for understanding social 
environment through attributions” defining the subject of “perception”, it is 
crucial to ask to what cause the performance observed can be attributed? In 
the thesis we shall maintain that the cause for EU Presidency is, among 
others, its own attitude, self-image, adopted role, which are accumulated 
into the notion of self-perception. Following from this and for the purpose 
of the thesis we shall define Presidency perception as the way  of 
understanding social environment based and conditional upon reactions to 
a variety of stimuli (economic, political factors, unforeseen events) emitted 
Self-
perception
norms 
Performance  
(policy 
outcome) 
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through individually adopted and exercised norms, expectations, roles, 
functions. Helen Wallace (1985) maintains that the framework of the 
Presidency’s general attitude to the EC and the particular interests that 
concern them will influence their behaviour and margin of manoeuvre.2 
 Now, when the definition of “perception” is given, it is important to 
establish who or what is the referent subject of perception – the self. 
Referring to J. Sutherland (2007), self-perception should be regarded as an 
actor3 as it cannot be treated as a cause being a concept.  Following from 
here, self-perception  should be regarded as behaviour that an actor emits to 
influence another behaviour (Sutherland: 2007). Considering the burden of  
EU Presidency is normally carried  by the government of the country 
hosting  the presidency, it would be logical to assume that the referent 
subject of perception is government. Manners (in Elgström 2003) refers to 
the performance of the “new idealistic government”, that facilitated the 
work of the British EU Presidency in the first half of 1998. Hellen Wallace 
in her study of the Council Presidency (1985) refers to “government” as a 
source of perception. Wallace further maintains that “it is unrealistic to 
expect governments to act out of character for six months Presidency 
period”4.  In measuring self-perception in Council Presidency I will partly 
rely on Bandura’s (1977) self-efficiacy model5(see Henck and Melnick 
1995), which maintains that performance could be taken into account as a 
factor  when estimating the capabilities of the Presidency.  
1.2.2. Performance 
Following the logic above (Thelen, Steinmo: 1992; Cini, Bourne: 2006; 
Moskowitz 2005  etc.) it can be established that government, as a law, rule 
and norm enforcing authority can be seen as the primary agent of 
performance, whereas the Presidency, as a “rule following satisfier” can be 
regarded as the secondary agent of performance. The tiers introduced, 
however, serve little purpose as both Government and Presidency could be 
seen as institutions that comprise formal rules, compliance procedures and 
customary practices( see Hall in Thelen 1992: 96) where validity, reliability 
and sensitivity6 of performance is ensured by policy outcomes. Following 
from here, government performance serves as a dependent variable (Stålfors 
2008: 21). Based on the variables introduced, performance, should be 
                                                                                                                                               
 
2 See H.Wallace, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, pp. 272-3 
3 According to Sutherland (2007: p.112-127), although the self-concept construes the subject of a 
person’s actions, a concept cannot be an actor 
4 Ibid.  
5 http://faculty.rcoe.appstate.edu/koppenhaverd/hardinpark/RSPS.pdf 
6 See in Debora Boehm-Davis, Robert W. Holt “The Science of Human Performance: Methods and 
Metrics”, Advances in Human Performance and Cognitive Engineering Research, Volume 5 157-193, 
Published by Elsevier, 2004. 
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treated as a policy outcome. Academic literature on performance suggests 
that ‘performance’ is something that should be measured and assessed 
(ibid.). Therefore indicators and criteria of performance should be 
introduced. Performance, taken broadly from a cognitive perspective, 
includes past successes, amount of effort necessary, patterns of progress 
and the belief in the effectiveness.7Confirmed further in the empirical part of 
the thesis, evaluation of performance should be done on an a priori 
standard, such as social purpose (Steinmo: 1992). To establish the purpose, 
I will use the articles of the Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on 
European Union and Treaty Establishing the European Community8, which 
state: 
 
1. The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its 
peoples. 
 
2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice 
without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in 
conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, 
asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime. 
 
3. The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a 
highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment 
 
The article points reveal important themes that can serve as indicators of 
performance. These will be the outcome reached in domains of: the a) EU 
Constitution, and b) macroeconomic management.  The latter is defined by 
Stålfors as comprising “economic growth, inflation, unemployment and 
budget deficit (Stålfors 2008: 25) and serve as signifiers for the construction 
of Presidency self-images, roles and self-perception. Based on the character 
concepts and for the purpose of the thesis, we shall utilise concepts that 
categorise performance into static and dynamic9. Using the logic of 
appropriateness, Presidency performance could be regarded as dynamic 
based on an assumption that Presidency acts with self-restraint, vision for 
the future of Europe and through acts that are governed by clear 
prescriptions and adequate resources (March and Olsen, 04/09). Static 
performance shall relate to the absence of self-restraint, vision and a 
situation where an actor is not able or willing to use rules ‘as a consequence 
to develop a community based on  common identity and a sense of 
belonging’ (March and Olsen, p.11). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
7 http://faculty.rcoe.appstate.edu/koppenhaverd/hardinpark/RSPS.pdf 
8  Points 1,2 and 3 of article II; http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf 
 
9 http://www.k-state.edu/english/baker/english320/cc-static_vs_dynamic_characterization.htm  
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1.2.3. Constructivism vs. Historical Institutionalism in Research 
Overview 
Defined by Hall (1996) as a theory focusing on the effects of institutions 
over time and the ways in which a given set of institutions, once 
established, can influence or constrain the behaviour of the actors, who 
establish them (Hall, Taylor: 1996, "Political Science and the Three New  
Institutionalisms" Political Studies 49/5, 936-57) historical institutionalism 
argues that institutional choices taken in the past persist, thereby shaping 
and constraining actors later in time (A.Wiener, T.Diez 2004: 139). 
Theoretical contribution of historical institutionalism to the EU presidency 
study will be confined to studying whether  attitudinal, perception and 
normative patterns towards the European integration persisted for the 
countries holding the presidencies. Following Thelen and Steinmo (1992:8) 
a key premise for historical institutionalism approach to Presidency 
performance is the rational choice causality, which allows us to see present 
institutions not so much as "all-knowing rational maximisers" but more a 
rule following "satisfiers"(ibid.). Thelen and Steinmo maintain that most of 
us, most of the time, follow societally defined rules, even when so doing 
may not be directly in our self-interest (Steinmo: 1992). Historical 
institutionalist argument comes into play when one perceives the EU 
Council presidency as a body built on historically-established patterned 
relations that lie at the core  of an institutional approach  (in Thelen, 
Steinmo 1992: 13).  The institutionalists claim that institutions structure 
political interaction and in this way affect political outcomes (Hall 1996 in 
Thelen et.al. 1992). The mediating function of the Presidency, however, 
limits this argument insofar as mediation is seen as an extention of 
negotiation, which is built on impartiality and neutrality, latter defined by 
Elgström (2003: 42) as a “ sense of total disinterest in the outcome”. 
Institutionalists, however, justify this by claiming that  institutions are an 
independent variable and explain political outcomes in periods of stability, 
but in break-down they become a dependant variable, whose shape is 
determined by the political conflicts.  The political turbulences and 
institutional turmoils therefore become the moments when the “logic of the 
argument is reversed from “institutions shape politics” to “politics shape 
institutions” (Thelen, Steinmo 1992: 14).  
As constructivism often assumes strong institutional and cultural effects 
(‘socialisation’ or ‘Europeanization’) at the systemic level, it would 
generally expect that member states have largely homogeneous preferences 
towards the performance indicators and thus there would be little conflict 
over the economic policies or Constitution issues (see M.Cini, A. Bourne 
2006: 107).  In explaining EU presidency self-perception, we shall refer to 
the constructivist concept of “logic of appropriateness”, which explains 
Presidency behaviour through rules, norms, expectations comprising both 
cognitive and normative components (March and Olsen, 1995: 30-31). 
Presidency choices and actions are conditioned by formal and informal 
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constraints such as norms, decision rules, institutional mandate (Elgström 
2003: 196). Presidency behaviour is therefore dependent on and constrained 
by what Habermas (1992: 432 in Fossum et.al 2009) calls “the streams of 
communicating information and points of view” – a public sphere, which, 
according to the logic of appropriateness, extrapolates the images and 
determines potential behaviours and roles of the Council Presidency 
through perceived anticipated value to be obtained by the Presidency in 
individual policy sectors. Performance emerges here as a dependent variable 
and the selection of roles and the construction of the Presidency’s self-
image may dependent on expectations entrusted to the Presidency in 
specific  policy areas as well as on certain historical  experiences. The 
Gaullist “France grandeur”( France prominence)  and “puissance Europe” 
(Power Europe) as well highly pro-integration public opinion influenced the 
way France and the French presidency perceived itself and its role in the 
European integration.  
Expectations may also serve as a stimulus for shaping national approaches 
to policy and therefore setting Presidency priorities and agenda in line with 
national and broader European expectations.  
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2 Literature Review 
Previous research on the subject has been rather broad. In this part we shall 
try to cover the main academic discourse that unfolded around the issue of 
the EU Council Presidency; we shall try to understand the phenomenology 
of the topic through acquainting ourselves with some of the existing 
research on the subject matter.  
2.1 Academic Discourse on the EU Council 
Presidency  
It has been noted by a number of researchers (Mayhew, Quaglia: 2007) that 
academic accounts on the EU Council Presidency are either theoretically 
descriptive or cases of individual presidencies. The general discourse on EU 
Council Presidency is, nevertheless, rather extensive.  Seen as either an 
amplifier or a silencer, the Council presidency has been portrayed as either 
prone to promote national concerns or inhibit them (Elgström et.al, 2004). 
Tallberg, through the thorough analysis of various presidency functions and 
evaluations of the Germany’s chairing of the  Agenda 2000 and France’s 
chairing of the IGC 2000, makes it explicit that EU Presidency possesses a 
set of  informational and procedural resources that can help unlock 
incompatible negotiating positions and secure efficient agreements, while at 
the same time allowing the government in office to shape distributional 
outcomes. Kirchner (1992) equally looks at the Council presidency through 
the functions lenses and treats the SEA as a “platform through which the 
Presidency could achieve measurable and meaningful results”. Academic 
discourse on Council Presidency equally involves a thorough description of 
Presidency functions, enumeration of which is important for the thesis to be 
able to assess the capacity that a Presidency has to influence its outcome 
and evaluate institutional and normative causality to performance. 
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The stocktaking of the German Council Presidency  has been provided by 
Tallberg and drawn on the leadership in the Agenda 2000 reform package10. 
Tallberg categorizes the experience and behaviour of the German 
Presidency as  winning, able to “weld together a compromise package, 
which was sufficiently appealing to all parties…”. Available literature on 
the German 2007 Presidency is scarce yet information is available in the 
form of on-line articles.In the analysis of the French Presidency, Fabio 
Liberti, an IRIS researcher focuses his attention on the personality of 
Nicolas Sarkozy attributing to him  the Gaullist vision of Europe, which, in 
Sarkozy’s specific case contained three different circles; the first would 
constitute a common security structure, including Russia, Ukraine, Turkey 
and perhaps Israel; the second circle would contain the current 27 members 
more Balkans states within a common market, with common institutions and 
where intergovernmental cooperation would dominate; the third circle 
would be the nucleus, and would incorporate more or less the current 
Eurozone plus the UK. This zone would be characterised by heightened 
coordination in the commercial and political economy and especially in a 
common defence system complementary to that of the  North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO).  
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
10 The Agenda 2000 reform package targeted agricultural policy, regional policy, and the EU’s financial framework 
for the period 2000–06. The driving concern behind this reform initiative was the financial implications of admitting 
10–12 new states. The Commission’s (1997) package of proposals, which effectively required the support of all 
governments, suggested: a) reducing price support for agricultural products and modifying direct income payments to 
farmers; b) concentrating the resources of the EU’s regional funds to the areas of greatest need; and c) , capping the 
annual budget at 1.27% GNP. 
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3 Functions and Norms of the EU 
Council Presidency 
3.1 EU Presidency Functions 
 
EU Presidency is carried out on several levels for six months: on the 
level of the European Council, the Council of Ministers, COREPER, 
Working Groups and embassies in third countries.(see Kirchner 1992, 
pp.71-90 for more information). The tasks, traditionally performed by the 
presidency and extensively described by a number of academicians 
(Wallace 1985; Heyes-Renshaw 1996, 2005; Kirchner 1992; Tallberg 2001; 
Elgström 2003, etc.) include those of administration and co-ordination11, 
setting priorities, mediation and representation. Functions and norms are 
interrelated: norms of impartiality or efficiency (Elgström 2003) exist 
within and are determined by the Presidency functions. The norm of 
impartiality is usually attributed to the function of mediation while the norm 
of effectiveness is intrinsic to practically all the functions.  It is therefore 
feasible to look at the functions and norms in one set. 
3.1.1 Administrative and Co-ordination function 
 
While Kirchner (1992: 79-81) devides administrative and coordination 
function, Elgström (2003: 4-7) merges these two in one explaining it by a 
big load of  both administrative and coordinating responsibilities, such as 
compiling and distributing documents, drawing up agendas, convening all 
meetings and at the same time making the necessary preparations with their 
couterparts in Brussels with the aim to increase probability that the 
incoming Presidency will receive the documents and proposals from the 
Commission that are needed to obtain results during its stint in office in the 
dossiers that it has prioritized. (Elgström: 2003:5 ). 
                                                                                                                                               
 
11  Literature on Council Presidency tend to merge the adminisrative and co-ordination functions ino one 
– adminisraive functiton. 
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3.1.2 Agenda-setting 
The task of preparing and presenting Presidency priorities is one of the 
central. Kirhcner’s description of the function as intitiative function 
resonates with the traditional Commission function, yet in practice, 
Kirchner states, there is a great deal of collaboration between the Presidency 
and the Commission on setting the six-months priorities.  Elgström, 
however, maintains the function has become even more pronounced with 
the Presidency’s responsibility for the agenda of the European Council 
meetings while the image of the Commission unable to provide leadership 
gives the Presidency the operational leeway. 
Tallberg (2001) introduces variations of the Presidency’s agenda 
shaping and subdivided into three types of agenda control: agenda setting 
(introduction of new issues), agenda structuring (emphasis adjustment on 
issues) and agenda exclusion (active barring of issues from the policy 
agenda). 
 
 
3.1.3 Mediation 
Mediation, consensus-building and brokering comprise the mediating 
function of the Presidency where the “chair is searching for compromises 
that are acceptable to all or at least to a majority of parties” (Elgström 
2003:6). Metcalfe (1998) maintains that Presidency’s ability to mediate 
“competing interests” is “sustained by adherence to the principle of 
impartiality, with respect to the interests of the other member governments 
and the principle of disinterest with respect to the interests affecting the 
Presidency’s (member states’) own interest.” With the post-enlargement 
increase in the number of member states the demand for Presidency 
mediating efforts and the “honest broker” role has augmented. Partiality, 
however, may also be exhibited to achieve more efficiency.  The absence of 
critique among member states in negotiations subject to qualified majority 
voting over the directive for the internal market in natural gas proposed by 
Luxembourg reflect that the “overriding concern of delegates is not to insist 
on impartial mediation, but to achieve efficient and favourable outcomes, 
which have the desired impact.” (see Underdal 1994 in Metcalfe 1998) 
3.1.4 Representative Function 
The Presidency equally carries out the task of  representing Council in 
international negotiations and in its relations with other  EU institutions 
(Elgström, 2003 pp.4-7). With regard to cooperation procedure, it must 
communicate to the EP the ‘common position’ taken by the Council 
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(Kirchner 1992) and in external matters, for example, Presidency acted and 
signed on behalf of the member states in the proceedings of the 1975 
Helsinki Act sharing with the Commission in EC affairs, but acting alone in 
CFSP (EPC) matters (ibid.). 
Bengtsson (see Bengtsson 2003: pp.55-71 in Elgström ed.) maintains 
the development of the representation function is part of an ongoing process 
of political institutionalization of the EU, a process in turn contested from 
various corners as it touches upon fundamental issues concerning the very 
nature and character of the EU as a political entity. The related problem, 
Bengtsson notes, lies in the rotating six-month presidency format, 
potentially hampering continuity and thus making it harder for the EU to 
speak with once voice externally. 
 
3.2 The norms of neutrality and effectiveness 
In the complex process of negotiations and decision-making, where 
Presidency seeks both effectiveness12 and leadership13, the quality of 
leadership can be determined by the quality of mediation it exhibits, i.e. the 
balance it maintains between being neutral(honest broker) and being 
partial/(being effective14).  Institutional changes within the EU have led to 
the emerged principal role of the Presidency in ensuring smooth and 
efficient functioning of the Council machinery (Metcalfe 1998). The norm 
of neutrality or impartiality is especially crucial for legitimating leadership 
(seen as the right to intervene), without which, Metcalfe believes that the 
actions of a potential leader will be rejected by other parties(ibid.).  
Impartiality is strongly linked with the lack of biases or preferences – 
sometimes strategically self-imposed by Presidencies (Elgström: 2003). In 
the case of the German 2007 Presidency, the German Foreign Minister 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier said Germany wanted to act as an “honest broker” 
to revive the EU Constitution.15  Adherence to norms in an attempt to 
legitimize leadership is further buttressed by the arguments of trust and 
consensus (Elgström 2003: 40), which are manifested in the efforts to foster 
a compromise based on trust among representatives and disinterest, which 
makes it easier for a negotiator to be consensus-oriented and detached 
(ibid.)  Partiality concept is divided by Elgström (2003) and Metcalfe 
                                                                                                                                               
 
12 See Elgsrtröm pp.202-203 
13 See Moravcsik, 3/268  
14 See Metcalfe, p.421 
15 Deutsche Welle, 19.12. 2006 
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(1998) who see it different along the semantic lines16 but share strong 
commonality in the idea that partiality is focused on ‘delivering a result”, 
i.e. being effective.  Metcalf here quotes Underdal (1994), who claims that 
‘the legitimization of partial leadership fits into  the idea that the overriding 
concern of delegates is not to insist on impartial mediation, but to achieve 
efficient and favourable outcomes, which have the desired impact’. 
Sustaining balance between impartiality and effectiveness is therefore a 
goal of a Presidency.  These norms were equally visible in how the German 
1999 EU Presidency self-perception of both German and French 
presidencies.  
Agenda 2000 reform negotiations17 show that the German Presidency of 
1999, despite highly competing interests, was able to balance out both 
individual preferences and outcome aspirations of other EU member 
negotiators.  
 
3.3 Reputation 
On the costs and benefits scale, reputation is a dependent variable that 
belongs to both camps (costs and benefits) and strongly depends on whether 
the Presidency follows norms and whether the behaviour and performance 
exhibited create a positive or negative image. Yet, the Presidency may 
disregard the norms if the gains they accrue from such behaviour exceed the 
expected costs of being labeled a norm-violator (Elgström 2003: 196). 
Internal or external crises and unexpected events give a particularly strong 
impetus for Presidencies to concern themselves with reputation costs. The 
case of the Constitution referenda outcomes in the Netherlands, France and 
Ireland made significant reputational damage to the French 2008 
Presidency, which was ultimately viewed as needing to “sell Europe”18 to 
the European citizens, at least in the area where reputation had been 
damaged the most – the EU Treaty. From the constructivist account, means 
to regain reputation are rooted in Presidency performance and correspond to 
the willingness of the Presidency to conform to norms and expectations.   
The case of the UK Presidency in 1998 showed at the attempts of the British 
Labour government to ‘change the ingrained image of the UK as an akward 
European partner’ (Elgström, p.196). 
                                                                                                                                               
 
16 Elgström (2003: 43) stresses relational partiality refers to a mediator having a higher chance to 
persuade a reluctant actor to “deliver” provided the actor has a special relationship with the mediator and 
high trust in his or her will. Underdal (1994) (in Metcalfe (1998: 421) believes legitimization of partiality 
only serves to prove the interest of the Presidency in the effective outcome. 
17 See Tallberg 
18 Le Figaro, 18.07.2008 
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Reputational aspect of self-perception is therefore deeply rooted in the 
ability of the Presidency “to deliver” in individual policy areas where 
expectations are high. Further we shall look at the expectations as a 
prerequisite for image and role selection of Presidencies. Expectations 
influence self-perception as a factor that tests reaction capability of the 
Presidency to a specific social, political or economic stimulus. Based on the 
reaction exhibited, a particular inference could be made about the 
Presidency’s capability and ideational image. The 2000 French Council 
Presidency for example, was regarded as “arrogant”. (Elgström: 2003) 
 
  16
4 Expectations and Role selection 
Expectations in Council Presidency performance are of central important 
here as they comprise the benchmark for evaluating the level of anticipation 
of result by the category of observers we shall call “others”.   
In explaining EU presidency self-perception, we refer to the 
constructivist concept of “logic of appropriateness”, which explains 
Presidency behaviour through rules, norms, expectations comprising both 
cognitive and normative components (March and Olsen, 1995: 30-31). 
Presidency choices and actions are conditioned by formal and informal 
constraints such as norms, decision rules, institutional mandate (Elgström 
2003: 196). Presidency behaviour is therefore dependent on and constrained, 
among other factors, by what Habermas (1992: 432 in Fossum et.al. 2009) 
calls “the streams of communicating information and points of view” – a 
public sphere, which, according to the logic of appropriateness, extrapolates 
the images and determines potential behaviours and roles of the Council 
Presidency through perceived anticipated value to be obtained by the 
Presidency in individual policy sectors. Performance emerges here as a 
dependent variable and the selection of roles and the construction of the 
Presidency’s self-image may depend on expectations entrusted to the 
Presidency in specific policy areas as well as on certain historical 
experiences. The Gaullist “France grandeur” and “puissance Europe”(power 
Europe) as well fairly optimistic19 public opinion influenced the way France 
and the French presidency perceived itself and its role in the European 
integration. 
Optimistic expectations of the French for the 12 months from autumn 
2007 were mainly concerned with economy and social issues 
(Eurobarometer 68).   
Expectations may also serve as a stimulus for shaping national 
approaches to policy and therefore setting Presidency priorities and agenda 
in line with national and broader European expectations. According to 
Sebastian Stålfors (2008: 56), government responsiveness to the 
expectations, interests, needs and demands of citizens influences how 
citizens rate the current political system. The ultimately embraced roles may 
therefore emerge as feedback loops. Elgström (2003) singles out several of 
such  causally-modified roles of a leader – a role in which Presidency is 
supposed to have visions that guide its behaviour, a bargainer egocentric 
                                                                                                                                               
 
19 Eurobarometer, France Report 68 in 2007 showed moderae oprimism of the French towards the 
European intetgraion before the start of the Presidency. 
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role, accentuating the domestic responsibilities of the member states where a 
Presidency is expressly  prioritizes national preferences; a broker, the role 
necessitating fostering compromises and “getting results” and a bureaucrat 
– the role of a routine, yet efficient Presidency.20 
Presidency self-perception and its behaviour can be influenced by 
intentions (Hall 1996), which in their turn may explain variations in role 
selection. Modeling Presidency behaviour may be constructed on the 
premise that intentions are part of a system of values, goals and attitudes 
that embeds intentions into the structure of other beliefs and aspirations. 
(March and Olsen: pp.65-66)21 Examples of France or Spain22 testify that 
intentions manifested in beliefs in and aspirations about the European 
integration determine the ultimate roles the Presidency chooses to realize 
these intentions. Intentions are not the sole cause of role-selection. 
According to Wiener and Diez (2004: 163), social norms like sovereignty 
also regulate behaviour and constitute the identity of actors. The French 
2005 referendum on the Constitution Treaty23 could be one such example.  
The roles, could be assumed, are therefore selected with the aim to adhere 
to the norms and satisfy intentions.  
4.1 The self-image of the EU24 
The qualitative study on the European citizens perceptions and the Future of 
Europe, conducted by Eurobarometer in February- March 2006 revealed 
that performance indicators outlined earlier in the thesis serve as intentions 
upon which self-image and roles could be constructed.  
Germany and France, belonging to the “old” bulk of the EU members are 
said to have expressed “dark” views concerning the Future of the EU. The 
specific reasons for concern among the European citizens were mostly of 
economic nature. For instance, employment was indicated as the greatest 
fear. Opening of borders as a cause for intensified immigration and ultimate 
                                                                                                                                               
 
20 See Elgström, Ole (ed.) European Union Council Presidencies. A Comparative Perspective. 
21 See March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, pp.65-66 
22 See Elgström 2003: 199 
23 See Pascale Dufour (2006) the referendum moment transformed the main cleavage about Europe, from 
more or less European integration to a right/left debate upon the nature of the European building. For 
some actors, these two dimensions are still closely interconnected (extreme-right party who defend 
French nation and national territory in the name of nation first but also in the name of the French social 
model ; some left republicans who want to preserve French sovereignty in the name of the French 
model), for others they are disconnected (more integration could be associated with more European social 
development and regulation, as for some European federalists or more integration could be associated 
with more free market as for the present government party, UMP); 
http://www.ces.columbia.edu/pub/papers/Dufour.pdf 
24 Eurobarometer Qualitative Study Among Citizens in the 25 EU member states, Overall Report, DG 
Communication; http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/quali/ql_futur_en.pdf 
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competition from low labour cost countries was attributed to the overall 
impact of globalization. Additional to this, weakening of social protection 
system was a cause for fear in most of the “old” countries. Immigration 
theme is continued in the concerns expressed over internal security, 
attributed to the difficulty of assimilating immigrants and broader world-
wide insecurity. Constitution was often mentioned in the polls as a symptom 
of “dissension” and sometimes of the mutual distrust, primarily among new 
member states.   The widespread expectations and hopes, according to 
Eurobarometer, are related to the continuing process of the European 
integration. 
Intentions to “deliver” in the respective policy fields can therefore be a 
prerequisites for Presidency self-images and role-selection. For the purpose 
of the thesis, we shall differentiate between intentions25 as determination to 
resolve for a specific result, and expectations26 concerning anticipation of a 
result. There are also different referent subjects for intentions and 
expectations, former being the Presidency (government), latter being the 
public.  
4.2 Role attribution in Presidency Self-
perception 
Presidency self-perception and its behaviour can be influenced by intentions 
(Hall 1996), which in their turn may explain variations in role selection. Modeling 
Presidency behaviour is sometimes constructed on the premise that intentions are 
part of a system of values, goals and attitudes that embeds intentions into the 
structure of other beliefs and aspirations. (March and Olsen: pp.65-66)27 
Examples of France or Spain28 show that intentions manifested in beliefs in and 
aspirations about the European integration determine the ultimate roles the 
Presidency chooses to realize these intentions. French leaders do not hesitate to 
share their firm convictions about the future of Europe with other member states 
and feel that they, as representatives of a major nation, have a responsibility for 
Europe29. The ultimate “grandiloquent” 2008 Presidency agenda and intentions to 
“make progress in  the process of a common policy for immigration, a common 
policy for defense and a common policy for energy and a common policy for 
environment”30 testify to the special integrative role the French Presidency aimed 
to embrace.  Intentions are not the sole cause of role-selection. According to 
Wiener and Diez (2004: 163), social norms like sovereignty also regulate 
                                                                                                                                               
 
25 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intention 
26 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/expectation 
27 See March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, pp.65-66 
28 See Elgström 2003: 199 
29 Ibid. 
30 http://www.sarkozynicolas.com/nicolas-sarkozy-conference-de-presse-8-janvier-2008-texte-integral/ 
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behaviour and constitute the identity of actors. The French 2005 referendum on 
the Constitution Treaty31 could be one such example.  The roles of silencer and 
amplifier, articulated by Elgström32 could therefore be treated as manifestations of 
intentions of either strengthening the tendency to promote national interests, or 
inhibiting national interests and encouraging European policy orientation 
(Elgström 2004). The intention of the German 2007 Presidency to act as an 
“honest broker” in dealing with Constitutional issue led to the identical role 
ultimately assumed. However, roles embraced by Presidencies in one policy area 
do not necessarily persist with regard to the wider vision of the European 
integration. Despite the French  2008 Presidency exhibited a “silencer”-type 
behaviour in negotiations procedures on Immigration Pact,  the initiative guided 
by the principles of nationalism and intergovernmentalism is difficult to reconcile 
with building a common European policy on migration, borders and asylum33  and 
thus Presidency role could be subject to a new role selection.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
31 See Pascale Dufour (2006) where he explains the sovereignty norm as a cleavage component stating:  
the referendum moment transformed the main cleavage about Europe, from more or less European 
integration to a right/left debate upon the nature of the European building. For some actors, these two 
dimensions are still closely interconnected (extreme-right party who defend French nation and national 
territory in the name of nation first but also in the name of the French social model ; some left 
republicans who want to preserve French sovereignty in the name of the French model), for others they 
are disconnected (more integration could be associated with more European social development and 
regulation, as for some European federalists or more integration could be associated with more free 
market as for the present government party, UMP); http://www.ces.columbia.edu/pub/papers/Dufour.pdf 
32 Elgström, Ole; Bengtsson, Rikard; Tallberg, Jonas  ”Silencer of Amplifier? The European Union 
Presidency and the Nordic Countries”, Scandinavian Political Science, Vol.27 – No. 3 , 2004.  
33 CEPS Policy Paper No.170 by Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild, Septembre 2008; A strong 
intergovernmental approach is also evident here in the sentence on border control: “the European Council 
recalls that each Member State is responsible for the controls of its section of the external border”. 
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5 EU Germany and France Council 
Presidency. Performance Overview 
This chapter is concerned with the performance of the German and French 
EU Presidency as related to the formerly established social purpose as the 
performance measurement, i.e. outcomes achieved in domains of Treaty 
reform, immigration and macroeconomy (including social policy). Other 
policy areas where performance of Council Presidency was especially 
indicative of the behavior exhibited will be looked at. 
5.1 Motivations and Priorities of the German EU 
Presidency 
 
Establishment and promotion of good relations with its Western neighbours 
as well as “integration as such” were the main motivations and interests of 
the German EU Presidency34.  France’s and the Netherlands’ rejection of 
the EU’s Constitutional Treaty at the respective national referenda, Poland’s 
and the British government opposition to the ECT made EU members turn 
their eyes towards Berlin (Overhaus: 2008). The major EU expectation was 
therefore dealing with the revival of the Constitutional Treaty. Not least, 
“issues remained at the national level with Länder trying to promote their 
“items”(ibid.) additional to the standing requests of deepening European 
integration, fully closing the EU’s democratic deficit, smooth running of 
institutions and capacity for action in an enlarged Union.35   
Attempts to revive the EU Constitution dominated the discourse of the 
German officials prior to the start of the Presidency with Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier (SPD Party) claiming Germany wanted to use its term to act as 
an “honest broker”.  Policy priorities largely reflected the demands of the 
German and European citizens in bettering results in specific policy areas 
(see Eurobarometer report 66). The tasks of the Presidency therefore aimed 
                                                                                                                                               
 
34 Sebastian Kurpas, Henning Riecke, German 2007 EU Presidency, Midterm Report, SIEPS, 
2008 
35 Jutta Hergenhan, German Federalism and European Integration, Notre Europe, European Issues No.5, 
2000 
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at satisfying these demands and constituted (see Spilberg speech, October 4 
2006): 
Public opinion polls reveal a strong commitment of both Germans 
and Europeans to utilitarian issues like employment or internal and external 
security. In autumn 2006 most of the Germans were sceptical about the state 
of economy with  54% of East Germans (+ 8 points) and 44% of West 
Germans (+3 points) believing that Germany’s economic situation will 
further deteriorate while their lives will 53% and 61% respectively believe 
their own lives will not change within the next twelve months.36  
 
 
1. maintaining  the European way of life in the era of globalization by means 
of a strong and dynamic economy and a social model attuned to citizens' needs;  
2. safeguarding internal security in the face of the threat of terrorism and 
cross-border crime, while at the same time preserving civil rights and freedoms;  
3. stabilizing Germany’s immediate geographical neighbourhood in Europe 
and promote freedom, democracy and free-market economies in other parts of the 
world;  
4. commitment to the future of our planet, i.e. to sustainable development, 
environmental and climate protection, and the preservation of our natural 
heritage.37 
 
  
 
Party politics in Germany is a highly important determinant of debate on 
Europe with Social Democrats (SPD), Christian Democratic 
Union/Christian Social Union (Bavarian sister organisation) (CDU/CSU), 
Liberal Democrats (FDP) and the Greens (Alliance 90/Die Gruenen) 
forming a “strong pro-European consensus”38 with Kanzleramt (the 
Chancellery) taking guidance and control over the European affairs. The 
governing Grand Coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD, articulated by Angela 
Merkel39 put forward the goal of ‘edging the external and internal contours 
of the European Union’ by means of fostering progress in individual policy 
areas and thus formulating an ambitious agenda comprising four priorities: 
o the relaunch of the Constitutional Treaty 
                                                                                                                                               
 
36 Eurobarometer, Report 66, 2006, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_de_exec.pdf 
37 Speech by Germany’s State Secretary Silberberg, October 4, 2006 “ A Privew of Germany’s EU 
Presidency: The Status of the Federal Government’s Preparations”. 
38 Sebastian Kurpas, Henning Riecke, German 2007 EU Presidency, Midterm Report, SIEPS, 2008 
39 Speech  by Angela Merkel to the European Parliament, Starsbourg, January 17, 2007; 
http://www.eu2007.de/en/News/Speeches_Interviews/January/Rede_Bundeskanzlerin2.html  
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o putting emphasis on economic reform, energy policy, EU foreign 
policy,           regulartory practice, climate protection 
o commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome 
o bringing the EU closer to its citizens.40 
 
 
5.1.1 EU Constitution 
The purpose of bringing the topic of the European Union 
Constitution into the Presidency agenda not only corresponds to the ongoing 
processes of the European integration, but also to the unexpected outcome 
of the French and Dutch referenda as well as the boost in membership 
number to include Romania and Bulgaria. Reviving or “breathing life into 
the dead Treaty”41 was therefore of increasingly high importance for the 
German Presidency and regarded by some as the “greatest challenge” and 
an obvious “yardstick” to measure the effectiveness of the Presidency’s 
performance. The plan was to present a roadmap of how to get the 
Constitution back on track, “in which the timetable and the contours of a 
solution are laid out” (in an interview of Frank-Walter Steinmeier to the 
Bild newspaper).  In the months preceding the Presidency Germany 
consulted member states on their expectations and biases concerning the 
roadmap.  
Furthermore, the drafting of the Berlin Declaration – the declaration 
for the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome was thought to be “testing 
the ground”.42  Setting the EU Constitutional treaty as a presidency priority 
could also be attributed to Germany’s looking at the Constitution as a “part 
of a larger vision of Europe as a federal entity”43.  
The major dividing line amongst the governments concerning the 
approach to the Constitutional treaty emerged between those who advocated 
pro-Constitution stance comprising those who ratified the Constitution plus 
Germany, Portugal and Ireland. The other camp comprised the advocates of 
the “amending treaty” approach, who favoured taking the existing treaties 
as a starting point44. These included France, the UK, the Netherlands plus 
the less outspoken Poland and Czech Republic.  Germany, however, seems 
to have joined the second camp to secure support from other members and 
                                                                                                                                               
 
40 See Mayhew and Quaglia (SEI, 2007) for more information 
41 Deutsche Welle, Germany Faces Daunting Agenda for EU, G8 Presidencies, 01.01.2007. 
42 Each government had to nominate two representatives from each country;  See Declaration on the occasion of the 
fiftieth anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome, (Berlin Declaration), Berlin, 25.3.2007, 
http://www.eu2007.de/de/News/download_docs/Maerz/0324-RAA/English.pdf   
43 See Mayhew and Quaglia (SEI, 2007) for more information, Working paper 97, You can’t always get 
what you want, but do you sometimes get what you need? Sussex European Institute, 2007 
44 See Kurpas, Henning Riecke, German 2007 EU Presidency, Midterm Report, SIEPS, 2008 
  23
claimed the need for the EU to “reform its founding treaties, which lay out 
how the EU operates”.45 This way the European treaties would be reformed 
by an “amending treaty”(Kurpas and Riecke: 2008). 
5.1.2 Economic policy and Internal market 
Back in November 2006 the German Federal Government issued a 
statement outlining the targets for economic growth and employment and 
emphasizing that an “agreement on a balanced package of measures aimed 
at promoting competitiveness, growth and employment as well as social 
cohesion and healthy environment” will be sought.46  ‘Restoration of 
economic dynamism’ articulated by the Germany’s State Secretary was 
considered a “prerequisite for the future-proof  EU” and becoming a “first-
division economic region”47.  The ambition echoes the aspiration vocalised 
at the 2000 Lisbon Summit where EU leaders declared they would turn the 
EU into “ the most dynamic and knowledge-based economy in the world by 
2010”48. The priority of the Presidency to deal with  Europe’s economic, 
social and environmental future largely reflect an all-European concern in 
improving the European economy (concern of 65% of Europeans and 75% 
of Germans)49 yet sustaining the European economic and social model 
where, the polled believed, EU performed better than the US.50  
The followed 2004 Kok report on the performance exhibited 
strongly critiqued the “disappointing delivery” made hitherto “due to the 
overloaded agenda, poor co-ordination and conflicting priorities” in 
addition to the lack of political will of the member states.51 It could well be 
possible that the critique served as a stimulus to craft effective economic 
and social policy responsive to the flaws of the Lisbon goals and the public 
opinion. It was therefore, especially articulated in the Council Conclusions 
that the German Presidency” “gave high priority to strengthening 
competitiveness and Europe’s social dimension” and “fleshed out Europe’s 
                                                                                                                                               
 
45 http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2007/06/2007-06-27-eu-bilanz-
einleitung__en.html  
46 Bundesregierung (Federal Government), 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2006/11/2006-11-30-europa-gelingt-
gemeinsam__en.html   
47 Speech by Germany’s State Secretary Silberberg, October 4th 2006 
48 http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/lisbon-agenda/article-117510  
49 Eurobarometer, Report 66, 2006, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_de_exec.pdf  
50 Europeans still see the USA ahead in the technical and scientific realm and in economic organisation 
and capability. Concerning social matters, the protection of the environment and the health care system, 
both Europeans and Germans see the EU as better organised and more capable than the USA. 
51 Ibid. 
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social dimension with concrete measures”52 such as the adoption of the 
Payment Services Directive, liberalisation of postal markets, reduction of 
roaming tariffs or the reduction of bureaucratic procedures named by 
Angela Merkel as the “cutback of bureaucracy”53   
While at the EU level, the German Presidency was able to achieve 
the setting to concrete targets for reducing  the administrative burden caused 
by EU legislation by 2012 by 25%, the question on the measurement of 
reduction still arises. Further, Kurpas (2007) claims the German Presidency 
failed to reach agreement on bureaucracy reduction at the national level and 
it was up to national governments to set their own targets.54 
At the Spring European Council it was agreed that the social 
dimension has special significance for Europe. Recalling the Erobarometer 
pre-Presidency polls, developing the European Social Model and taking 
“greater account” of the Member States’ social aims were high on the 
Presidency’s agenda.55  With regard to internal market, the German 
presidency came up with the Remedies directive, reached during the 
Presidency, with the aim to ensure a higher level of legal certainty for 
companies when it comes to the award of public contracts.(see Federal 
Government Stocktaking on the German EU Presidency). Achievement 
could also be regarded the political agreement on the modernization of the 
Customs Code.   The approach advocated by the German Presidency with 
regard to the social policy served as a reaction test to the ongoing critique 
examined the ability to satisfy ‘consumers’ demands. 
  
 
5.1.3 Energy and Climate 
Climate and Energy, regarded by Germany as “one of the greatest 
challenges of the 21st century”56, was a top priority for the German 
Presidency. Before the European Council set targets on reducing CO2 
emission by 30% by 2020, the Commission Communication “An Energy 
Policy for Europe” had offered its proposals for the Action Plan “with 
                                                                                                                                               
 
52 Europe-Succeeding Together. Taking Stock of Germany’s EU Presidency, Federal Government; 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2007/06/Anlagen/2007-06-27-bilanz-der-deutschen-
eu-ratspraesidentschaft,property=publicationFile.pdf  
53 Kurpas et.al, SIEPS p.23 
54 Ibid. 
55 See Federal Government Stocktaking of the Germany’s EU Presidency at  
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2007/06/Anlagen/2007-06-27-bilanz-der-deutschen-
eu-ratspraesidentschaft,property=publicationFile.pdf  
56 Federal Government, German Presidency Stocktaking; 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2007/06/Anlagen/2007-06-27-bilanz-der-deutschen-
eu-ratspraesidentschaft,property=publicationFile.pdf  
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equally ambitious targets for energy efficiency” (20% reduction in energy 
consumption by 2020)57.  
In addition to that, German Presidency performance record contains 
a binding agreement that the share of renewable energies in overall 
consumption would reach 20% by 2020 plus a European Energy Strategy 
for Transport with measures aimed at improving climate relevance, energy 
efficiency and the increased use of fuels in road and other type of 
transport.58 The agreement reached on the Action Plan for an Energy Policy 
for Europe came out as, yet, another success of the Presidency, despite a 
couple of serious conflicts that erupted upon Commission’s energy proposal 
for a “full ownership unbundling”59 and the EU Environment 
Commissioner’s plan for reduction of CO2 emission from cars.60 
The efforts undertaken by the German Presidency to tackle energy and 
climate matters were transferred to the attempts to push other developed 
countries, such as the USA to embrace similar climate responsibilities; yet, 
the response was not particularly forthcoming. 
 
 
 
5.2 Motivations and Priorities of the French EU 
Presidency 
 
The French EU Presidency constituted an interesting mix of “hopes and 
skepticism”, - latter mostly due to the outcome exhibited by France in the 
2005 referendum on the draft constitutional treaty.  The picture gets even 
more exciting with the “heterodoxical”61 image of Sarkozy, who entered the 
Office in 2007 and since then made a proposal to draft a new EU treaty. 
European motivations of France, however, go back to the Gaullist vision of 
Europe through the lenses of a special French role in the integration process 
where Europe was at least driven by ‘commercial motivations’ and 
‘idiosyncratic geopolitical perspectives’ (Moravcsik 1998:pp.12-14) and at 
most a vector of France grandeur and the leading role ( see van Herpen, p.5) 
                                                                                                                                               
 
57 Kurpas et.al., p25 
58 See German Federal Government Stocktaking for more information. 
59 The major German energy suppliers immediately voiced their opposition to full ownership unbundling 
and the Minister for Economics and Technology Michael Glos (CSU) claimed that it would endanger the 
security of supply and even be in contravention of the German Constitution, see Kurpas and Riecke, p.26 
60 The plan caused uproar among car manufacturers in Germany, who produce mostly large cars, which 
emit on average more CO2 than smaller models from France or Italy, ibid. 
61 Christian Lequesne and Olivier Rozenberg, The French Presidency of 2008: Unexpected Agenda, 
SIEPS, 2008 
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in the European integration. Gaullist typology continued with the “socialist” 
and “volatile” 62 types Gaullists emerging as forms of sustaining national 
interests at the expense of common means. The concept of Europe 
puissance (Europe power), which dominated the French and European 
political scene before Maastricht transformed into a more rational approach 
buttressed by the need of France to prove it was back in Europe after the 
2005 referendum and Chirac’s allegedly immobilizing approach to the EU 
at the end of his term. Expectations in autumn 2007 remained steadily 
growing with regard to immigration (36%, +6 points), common defence and 
security policy (82%, =), climate and environment (41%, +3 points)63   The 
emergence of Nicolas Sarkozy as a political figure promising to return 
France to the EU, draft a ‘simplified’ version of the Lisbon Treaty and find 
a solution to the emerged deadlock – all reflected largely a responce to 
moderate optimism among the French towards the European integration 
processes exhibited.  The priorities chosen, therefore, aimed at rejuvenating 
Euroenthusiam among the French and Europeans and reflected the internal 
demand: firstly, to take immigration and asylum; secondly reforming CAP; 
thirdly, reaching progress in the area of climate-energy package; fourthly, 
reviving the European Security and Defense policy by means of creating a 
commanding and planning unit for ESDP missions, revising the European 
Security Strategy and defining the rules governing Permanent Structured 
Cooperation provided in the Lisbon Treaty64. 
The ‘grandiloquence’ (Lequesne 2008) of agenda and ambition of 
Nicolas Sarkozy was further reinforced by the speech, where he stated on 
January 8 that “by the end of the French Presidency my objective is to make 
progress in the process of a common policy for immigration, a common 
policy for defence and a common policy for energy and a common policy 
for environment”65. The events that occurred during the French Presidency 
term allow us to speculate on the Presidency’s normal agenda and introduce 
crisis agenda ( term taken from an interview), latter as a reaction capability 
test. 
 
5.2.1 Pre-determined Agenda 
                                                                                                                                               
 
62 Van Herpen, Marcel “Chirac Gaullism: Why France Became the Driving Force Behind an Autonomus 
European Defence Policy?” Van Herpen stresses Mitterrand’s “social Gaullist” and Chirac’s “volatile 
Gaullist” inclinations. 
63 See Eurobarometer Report 68, Autumn 2007, published Spring 2008. 
64 Fabio Liberti, l’IRIS, December 2008; http://www.iris-france.org/en/index.php 
65 A la fin de la présidence française, mon objectif est qu’elle ait avancé dans la voie d’une politique 
commune de l’immigration, d’une politique commune de la défense, d’une politique commune de 
l’énergie et d’une politique commune de l’environnement.; http://www.sarkozynicolas.com/nicolas-
sarkozy-conference-de-presse-8-janvier-2008-texte-integral/ 
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The initial pre-determined agenda of the French Presidency comprised three 
broader aims of a) making Europe a model of sustainable social, ecological 
and economic development; b) making Europe more attentive to the rights, 
security and aspirations of citizens and c) reinforcing Europe’s role in the 
international stage.66  The priorities of the Presidency were there fine-tuned 
to match the broader aims. 
 
Immigration  
 
 The motivations for immigration as a French Presidency priority 
reflected both the growing public demand for internal security (82%)67 and 
events that preceeded the French Presidency. The December 2007 European 
Council announced the development of a comprehensive European 
migration policy a “fundamental priority of the Union”, and called for a 
“renewed political commitment on this front” (French Presidency Working 
Programme). Chirac’s concerns over the lack of cooperation in the 
migration and asylum sectors as well as Sarkozy’s interest in including 
immigration into his agenda at the time of his being the Minister for 
Domestic Affairs are also said to have contributed to putting immigration 
on the French Presidency agenda.68  The idea to respond to Europe’s labour 
and economic needs was translated into the idea to negotiate a European 
Pact on Immigration and Asylum, not least to fulfil one of Sarkozy’s 
ambitions for a “common policy for immigration”.  The ideational 
framework for the pact was the idea that legal immigration constitutes a tool 
for economic growth, both of the European Union as a whole and of each 
individual state within the EU.  The pact uses the term “immigration 
choisie” or “selective immigration”, which rests on the idea of developing 
immigration policies by member states taking into account the perceived 
needs in their own labour markets and the potential impact that domestic 
policies will have on other member states.69 With regard to irregular 
migration, the Pact called for reinforced cooperation among member states; 
in border control domain the Pact considered a number of measures with 
mixed responsibilities among member states (SIEPS 2007).  The explicit 
intergovernmental nature of the Pact questioned the intention of building a 
common European policy on migration. The Pact was very much oriented 
towards the member states and was driven by a predominately 
intergovernmental logic prioritising the competences of the member states 
over those of an EU at 2770.  If results of the Presidency performance in this 
specific sector are to be viewed as “strategic interaction” (Risse 2000: 3) 
                                                                                                                                               
 
66 French Presidency Working Programme, 
http://www.eu2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/ProgrammePFUE/Programme_EN.pdf 
67 Eurobarometer 68 
68 SIEPS Study on the French Presidency, 2008 
69 CEPS Policy Paper No.170 by Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild, Septembre 2008 
70 Ibid. 
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among actors, who are guided by specific preferences, performance of the 
Presidency in this specific area can be regarded as self-interested, rational 
and efficient. 
 
Climate Change and Energy 
 
The French Presidency continued the Action Plan on “Energy Policy for 
Europe” agreed on under the German Presidency.  The ambition to set 
climate package as a priority was, among other reasons, driven by  the 
desire to “reinforce its driving role and credibility in international 
negotiations on climate change”71 
The idea of regaining credibility in international negotiations was also 
close to the broader idea of maintaining competitiveness in this area72 In his 
statement, the French State Secretary Jean Pierre Jouyet said “Europe must 
be competitive and open so that its market functions better, but this opening 
must be done in the interests of a safer and more independent Europe in 
terms of energy. We will not accept liberalization solutions, which lead to a 
weakening of the European producers – in other words a weakening of 
Europe’s independence and sovereignty on this issue.”73 It was clear from 
both official statements and the volume of tasks envisioned within the 
agenda that climate change and energy issue will be one of the main 
yardsticks to measure the Presidency performance. This was further 
confirmed by President Sarkozy, who stated climate issue was “probably 
the most delicate issue of the Presidency”74. This phrase in view of the 
French penchant for cant phrases, could be treated as raising the value of the 
ultimate outcome delivered or as a caution lest negotiations on the issue fail. 
Negotiatins on the climate and energy package were, indeed, regarded 
as a challenge.(SIEPS Report 2008).  Fears about negative economic 
consequences in terms of slower economic growth were vocalized by some 
of the CEE countries. Germany favoured free CO2 quotas for its most 
exposed industries, while France acted protectionist to get firms importing 
products from outside the EU buy CO2 quotas.75 Cleavages between 
member states, Commission and the European Parliament could also be 
tracked along the question of revenues, generated by  ETS (emission trading 
scheme) with member states being staunchly opposed to Brussels 
intervening into matters of individual member state concern. The agreement 
with the European Parliament was finalized (See French Presidency Review 
and Outlook). In the Outlook, the Presidency is also explicitly positioned as 
a problem-solver adopting a roadmap to combat “significant increase in 
                                                                                                                                               
 
71 See Working Programme for the 2008 French EU Presidency. 
72 http://www.openeurope.org.uk/research/frenchpresidency.pdf Competitiveness was to be maintained 
by demanding reciprocity from the French partners in this area, mainly China. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Nicolas Sarkozy, interview in France 3, 1 July 2008 in SIEPS Study on the French Presidency, 2008 
75 Christian Lequesne, Olivier Rozenberg “The French Presidency of 2008: the Unexpected Agenda”. 
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petrol prices”, yet noting that “mechanisms aimed at reducing the impact of 
increased energy costs in the long term should be pursued in the context of 
long term pressure on resources. Researchers of the Presidency thus 
conclude the outcome of the Presidency in this particular policy sector is 
“uncertain” (Lequesne et.al. 2008).  
 
 
Lisbon Treaty  
 
The urgency and importance of adjusting priorities to fit the Lisbon 
Treaty was caused by the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by Ireland with 
53.4% voting “no”76. 
A significant diplomatic turn in the approach exercised by the French Presidency 
was taken in the result of the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by Ireland and the 
Russian-Georgian conflict. The Presidency was thus forced to exhibit pro-active 
style of work. EU Council Conclusions of October 2008 contained a line with 
reference to the Lisbon Treaty, stating “The Irish Government will continue its 
consultations with a view to contributing to finding a way to resolve the 
situation”77. The ambiguity of phrasing slightly marred the pro-active image of 
the Presidency and annoyed Sarkozy and who was counting on more substantive 
progress in this domain (SIEPS 2008). His continued verbal pressure over the 
necessity for the rest of the states who had not ratified the Treaty to ratify it has 
been called “pressure politics” and “external blackmail”78 Due to significant 
delays in Treaty ratification process the European Council delivered a number of 
statements concerning measure to expediate Treaty ratification, ‘notably transition 
measures concerning the composition of the European Parliament (increase in the 
number of Members of the European Parliament as soon as possible after the 
entry into force of the Treaty for the 12 Member States  for which this number 
should increase79. A compromise solution adopted by the European Council on 
December 11 and 12 comprised a number of statements and proposals concerning 
‘legal guarantees to respond to the concerns expressed by the Irish on taxation 
policy, the family, social and ethical issues and the policy of neutrality.”(ibid.) 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Crisis  Agenda 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
76 See Euractiv at  http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/irish-eu-treaty-referendum/article-172508  
77 Presidency Conclusions; http://www.delgeo.ec.europa.eu/en/press2008/081016.pdf 
78 See Christian Lequesne and Olivier Rozenberg, p.21 The French Presidency of 2008: Unexpected 
Agenda, SIEPS, 2008 
79 Review and Outlook of the French Presidency, www.ue2008.fr  
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In the introduction I already mentioned the role that situational factors play 
in shaping behaviour- they provoke reactions and offer opportunities for 
action (or obstacles to action). In the course of interviews it was revealed 
that in Presidency performance in times of internal or external turbulences 
an important role could be played by the so called “crisis agenda”. While 
“crisis agenda” remains a contentious concept80, it nevertheless was a 
visible situational factor in which the behaviour of the French Presidency 
managed to deliver feasible results. 
The French Presidency’s “crisis agenda” comprised two major events, 
which a) tested the Presidency’s capability to be reactive and pro-active at 
the same time b) examined France’s commitment to strengthen the 
European Security and Defence Policy. 
The strong bias towards NATO as a left-over from the Gaullist wartime 
suspicion of the Anglo-Saxon tandem (Moravcsik: 1998) has characterised 
France’s attitude and behaviour towards entering the alliance for several 
decades. Tackling this priority reflected an overwhelming French support 
for a common defence and security policy (82%)81 and the resurrection of 
the military capabilities of the Union. France insisted on strengthening 
ESDP capabilities and making ESDP and NATO complimentary. (Lefebvre 
2009: 3). The unexpectedly erupted conflict in Georgia served as a 
sufficient justifier and an impetus to again vocalise the French own 
aspirations regarding NATO and foster the security agenda, which was 
based on an ambition to strengthen EU’s military and crisis management 
capabilities, which included strengthening civilian crisis management 
capabilities (mobilisiation of police and customs officers), capabilities for 
planning and conducting ESDP military and civilian operations, etc. 82 The 
European Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia was therefore a timely 
and relevant operational contribution to the Presidency reaction and action 
capability.  
Financial crisis was the second situational factor and a reaction test for 
the French Presidency to “take a rapid and coordinated response”.83 Raising 
the level of deposit guarantees for individuals, amendment of the 
accounting rules, solidarity action with some of the EU members (like 
Hungary or Latvia) and reform of the international financial system based 
on the principles of responsibility and transparency were among the many 
ambitious proposals that characterised the French Presidency in general and 
President Sarkozy in particular as proponents of the “reform of the world’s 
capitalist system”84 where the role of institutions in regulating market is 
high.  This approach was confirmed in Sarkozy’s vision of the “economic 
government for the Euro zone” (ibid). 
                                                                                                                                               
 
80 Academic literature suggests that Presidency agenda is pre-determined by the ongoing processes and 
“Community timetable”, see Kirchner, 1992, p.100 
81 Eurobarometer Report 68, 2007. 
82 French Council Presidency Working Programme. 
83 Eurobarometer Report 68, 2007 
84 SIEPS Study on the French Presidency 2008. 
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5. Content Analysis 
Content analysis has been noted by a number of academicians to be a major 
component in qualitative and quantitative research within various disciplines. In 
conducting content analysis I will largely rely on the works by Ole Holsti (1969),  
Bernard Berelson (1971) and Kimberly Neuendorf (2002) . 
Following the mentioned literature and for the purpose of the thesis, we shall 
define content analysis as a qualitative technique for making inferences by 
objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages 
(Berelson 1952:18; Neuendorf 2002:34). Janis’ definition allows for more leeway 
looking at content analysis as “referring to any technique, which relies solely 
upon the judgments (which theoretically may range from perceptual 
discriminations to sheer guesses)”85 The definition reflects Holsti’s (1969) 
understanding of content analysis as the analysis that is “always performed on a 
message”, and is therefore, qualitative in its nature.  The approaches chosen for 
the analysis confirm the qualitative commitment of the analysis.   In the course of 
the thesis we inferred on the behaviour exhibited by the Presidency in individual 
policy domains.  As studying perception and performance is inevitably linked to 
studying behaviour, qualitative nature of content analysis may yield better clues to 
the particular performance of a particular presidency at a particular  moment in 
time. According to Berelson (1971), content analysis can describe 
communication, but it may not per se, evaluate them (Berelson:46). Evaluation 
necessitates the acceptance of a standard, with which the communication content 
is then compared by means of content analysis (ibid.). He therefore suggests using 
an ‘a priori’ social purpose to evaluate performance. Drawing on the Treaty of 
Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, social purpose can be established through points 1,2 and 3 
of article II86 of the Treaty, which state: 
 
1. The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples. 
 
2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without 
internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with 
appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the 
prevention and combating of crime. 
 
3. The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly 
competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a 
high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment 
                                                                                                                                               
 
85 Janis I.L “The problem of validating content analysis. In H.D. LAsswell, N. Leites (et.al) The 
Language of politics: studies in quantitative semantics; in Hostli, O. “Content Analysis in Social 
Sciences and Humanities”. 
86 http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf 
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The aim of EU Council Presidency Self-Perception Content Analysis is 
to approach causality concept “ EU Presidency self-perception determines  
performance” in cases of the French EU Council Presidency 2008 and 
German Council Presidency 2007.  The specific aim is to establish whether 
EU Presidency self-perception is treated in the German and French media as 
predicting the Presidency performance as covered in the selected articles. 
 
Content Analysis Research Design87 
 
Purpose  Branch of 
semiotics 
Type of 
Comparisons 
Question Research 
Problem 
- To make 
inferences as 
to the effect 
of 
communicati
on 
- to diagnose 
specific 
behaviour 
traits based 
on the noted 
observations 
- to establish 
whether 
Presidency 
behaviour 
predicts 
Presidency 
performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pragmatics 
(for all) 
 
 
 
 
 
Sender, 
Messenger/Reci-
pient, Messages 
 
 
 
 
 
To what 
effect? 
 
 
 
- analyse the 
flow of 
information 
- make 
behavioural    
attributions 
- assess 
responses in 
communicat
ion 
 
5.1. Integrated approach to Content Analysis  
Neuendorf (2002) offers an integrated approach, which categorizes and 
characterizes content analysis onto descriptive, inferential, psychometric and 
predictive. She maintains, “only with an integrated approach to data collection can 
applications of content analysis aspire to the highest goal: explanation” (2002: 
47). Initial  academic introduction into the subject of EU presidencies testing of 
                                                                                                                                               
 
87 Based on the CA Table by Holsti, 1968, p.26 
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self- and “others” perception as variables that could affect the ultimate 
performance allow me to pool and employ and possibly merge predictive, 
inferential and psychometric approaches  to content analysis offered by Neundorf 
(2002) latter in a more semi-diagnostic fashion. According to Neuendorf (2002), 
“in inferential content analysis, interpersonal communication-type content 
analysis (with known receivers) tend to infer to the source, whereas mass 
communication-type studies  (with undifferentiated receivers) tend to  attempt to 
infer to receivers or receiver effects or both.” Predictive type of analysis aims at 
prediction of some effect or outcome of the message under examination. 
Psychometric approach, in its turn, involves process of validation, in 
which content analysis is linked with other time-honored diagnostic methods, such 
as observations of the subject’s behaviour with the ultimate goal to infer to a 
given source after careful validation88 [with other sources].  Explanation will, 
therefore, be achieved through describing, inferring and diagnosing and predicting 
certain performance characteristics through variations in behaviour.  
As such, the methodological part of the thesis will rest on conducting the analysis 
of content taken from the German and French media, Council presidency-
published resources, interviews with German and French government officials 
(high-rank diplomats) and non-governmental organizations. The offered 
framework below concerns with providing theoretical background on and 
rationale for content variables, concepualisation, which includes  definitions of 
self-percepion and performance given earlier in the text and content screening; 
sampling, where sources for analysis are indicated, categorization and coding; 
reliability, validity and reporting. 
 
 
 
 
5.1.1. T
Theory and Rationale 
Theory and Rationale: What is examined and why? 
 The object of investigation is the performance of two EU Council presidencies – 
German in the first half of 2007 and French in the second half of 2008.  The basis 
for the analysis is the content drawn from selected articles in the French and 
German media as well as presidency press releases, statements and speeches (both 
text and audio) reflecting on the performance of the presidencies and contributing 
to the construction self-perception image. 
  The Study on the EU German and French presidencies essentially focuses on the  
following research question: 1) How do German and French presidencies perceive 
themselves and their performance?  2) How do others perceive the performance of 
the German and French presidencies? 3) Has self-perception affected the 
performance of the German and French presidencies in 2007 and 2008? 
                                                                                                                                               
 
88 Kimberly Neuendorf “Content Analysis Guidebook”, pp.50-69, SAGE 2002 
ÆTheory and rationaleÆ SamplingÆConceptualizationÆ CodingÆReliabilityÆ 
ValidityÆ Reporting 
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 In the course of the analysis operationalisation, I will try to merge descriptive, 
inferential and psychometric approaches to content analysis as well as integrate 
interviews with the German and French government officials working in the 
respective embassies, NGO representatives  linking content analysis with other 
data to show relationship with both source and receiver characteristics. 
 
Inter-relationship of self-perception and performance  
 
Literature on social cognition (Moskowitz: 2005) suggests that our experience 
of self-esteem is linked to social comparison and depends on how we perform 
relative to others. Hall (1986) argues the organization of policy making influences 
an actor’s perception of his own interests, by establishing his institutional 
responsibilities and relationships to other actors. In this way, organizational and 
cognition factors affect both the degree of pressure an actor can bring to bear on 
policy and the likely direction of that pressure (ibid). Moskowitz (2005)  
contributes to the perception conceptualization stating “the perceivers are active 
participants in interpreting the behaviour (they) observed, with (their) psychology 
as perceivers often being a larger factor in determining how a behaviour is 
interpreted than the actual behaviour that is observed".  
Presidency viewed as a group of professional individuals executing 
managerial Council presidency tasks in its respective bodies represents a 
collective set of behaviours. Referring to Ichheiser (in Moskowitz: 2005), “the 
behaviour of the individual is always determined by two groups of factors: by 
personal factors (attitudes, dispositions, etc) and by situation factors. The situation 
plays its part in determining behaviour in two ways: as a system of stimuli, which 
provokes reactions, and as a system of opportunities for action (or obstacles to 
action). Ichheiser further maintains that […] the importance of situational factors 
is often greater than the importance of personal factors”. 
 
5.2. Conceptualisation 
According to Neuendorf (2002) variables used in the empirical part should be 
described and defined. If looking at the title of the thesis through the cause-and-
effect prism, we may regard self-perception and perception by others as 
 “presumed causes” and therefore as  independent variables, while performance 
will serve as a “ presumed effect” and therefore as a dependent variable.  Earlier 
in the thesis we defined self-percepion as a type of behaviour and a way  of 
understanding social environment based and conditional upon reactions to a 
variety of stimuli (economic, political factors, unforeseen events) emitted through 
individually adopted and exercised norms, expectations, roles, functions. We refer 
to the definititon of performance as “ policy outcome” and use cognitive 
explanation to include past successes, amount of effort necessary, patterns of 
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progress and the belief in the effectiveness.89 Earlier in the thesis we introduced 
two types of performance which shall be checked against validity in the content 
analysis. These are static and dynamic performance. 
  
5.2.1. Content Screening 
 
  Content screening for the German EU Presidency is based on the articles 
published by and posted on the Deutsche Welle website, Süddeutschezeitung and 
the German Bundestag Documentation Centre and European Affairs section.  
French EU Presidency Content Screening is based on the newspapers le Figaro, 
La Tribune and 
 
  Deutsche Welle portrays the German 2007 Presidency at the start of the 
presidency as a “missionary”. The inference is drawn based on the wording of the 
tasks, aimed at “saving the EU's failed constitution and hammering out a new 
energy security policy for the 27-nation bloc.”  The Süddeutschezeitung (SZ) 
before the start of the presidency makes a lucid claim on the mission to “revive” 
(wiederzubeleben) the discussion on the EU Constitutional Treaty90. The subject 
of the Constitutional Treaty at the time of the constitutional turmoil and is 
therefore for obvious reasons at the core of the media discourse on the German 
EU presidency. SZ speaks of the “urgent need” in a Constitutional Treaty for the 
EU and states it’s up to the German presidency to make it operational 
(handlungsfähiger= Germ. able to act) and transparent (transparenter).91 
The ideas of bringing Europe “back on track” and “regaining its ability to act” 
became leitmotivs   before and at the start of the German presidency in the 
examined media sources. Hans-Gert Pöttering in a DW interview wanted the 
presidency to “come up with a way of moving forward”, mainly referring to the 
European Constitution, be “ambitious”, “choose our values. Germany, despite a 
grand agenda, nevertheless, realized its performance could not and would not 
exceed the capacities it possessed. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier noted “we cannot perform miracles in six months”92  The cautious tone 
was repeated once again by Angela Merkel with regard to the Treaty, who stated 
“that half a year may not be sufficient to resurrect a treaty that has been in the 
deep freeze for more than 18 months.” Pöttering further noted that “it is important 
to make it clear to people that the glass is half full, not half empty. And if we 
approach European policy with optimism and hope and confidence, then I think 
                                                                                                                                               
 
89 http://faculty.rcoe.appstate.edu/koppenhaverd/hardinpark/RSPS.pdf 
90 Nun ist es also an Deutschland, die Diskussion wiederzubeleben, SZ,  11.10.2006, 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/347/402128/text/ 
91 Dabei benötigt die EU dringendst einen neuen (Verfassungs-)Vertrag, um handlungsfähiger und 
transparenter zu werden, 11.10.2006, Süddeutschezeitung “Gefordet und Fordernd, Deutsche 
Europapolitik“ , by Bernd Oswald 
92 Deutsche Welle, 19.12.2006, « Germany Wants EU Constitution Back on Track » 
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we will be able to get Europe moving forwards again and the people of Europe 
moving forward with us.”93 
  
A contribution to self-perception characterization was offered by Foreign 
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier who claimed Germany should play an “honest 
broker”.  SZ focuses on the personality trait of the Chancellor Merkel, namely 
“ambition”, stating “The expectations of the German EU Council presidency are 
high-so is the ambition of the Chancellor”94  
Broader discourse on the outcome of the German EU presidency portrays the 
presidency outcome as largely the outcome that fulfilled expectations – 
presidency as  a promise keeper. Merkel noted “"At the end of the day we did not 
disappoint people's expectations and we avoided a division”.  With regard to the 
EU treaty and the post of high representative, Merkel stated it was “European 
political quantum leap”95 
 “It’s been exciting time – but also challenging”, Merkel added.96 The most 
commonly inferred was the concept of cooperative task resolution through 
common action, confirmed in a number of sentences97 or through the use of the 
words “we” and “together”. Süddeutschezeitung speaks at the end of the 
presidency of a “ therapy” that Germany allegedly applied in the so called “crisis 
mood”.98 A significant contribution to the characterization of the German 
presidency as cooperative has been the utterance of Angela Merkel to the 
European Parliament claiming “Who wants to move fast should do it alone, who 
wants to move far should do with others”.99  
  
The French presidency, as portrayed through Le Figaro, at the start of the term 
seemed less optimistic. Le Figaro regards the French as having an “ambiguous 
attitude” towards Europe100 The ideas of “European norms affirmation” through 
technical cooperation or “European values affirmation” through the EU social 
policy 101 were vocalized in the speech by the French EU Affairs Secretary Jean-
Pierre Jouyet. Cooperative rhetoric can be observed in the French media in time of 
                                                                                                                                               
 
93 Deutsche Welle, 06.01.2007, « Without Values, EU Has No Future » 
94 Die Erwartungen an die deutsche EU-Ratspräsidentschaft sind hoch - der Ehrgeiz der Kanzlerin auch, 
SZ, 11.10.06 
95 Deutsche Welle, 29.06.2007, « Merkel Bids Adieu to EU Presidency with Praise for Treaty » 
96 Deutsche Welle, 29.06.2007, « Merkel Calls G8 Summit, EU Presidency Tremendous Fun » 
97 ” Together we made progress overall”, SZ, 29.06.2007 
98 Süddeutschezeitung, 18.06.2007, „Tätscheln, Taktieren und Therapieren“, by Martin Winter 
Kirsenstimmung in Es ist wieder einmal eine Zeit der Krisenstimmung, Süddeutschezeitung, 
99 Süddeutschzeitung, 26.07.2007 „Merkel Warnt vor Neuen Gräben in Europa“Wer schnell gehen will, 
sollte es alleine tun, wer weit gehen will, sollte es mit anderen tun, Süddeutschzeitung, 26.07.2007 
„Merkel Warnt vor Neuen Gräben in Europa“ 
100 Le Figaro 08-07-2008 “les Français ayant une relation ambiguë à l'Europe”  in “Comment les 
ministres vont “vendre l’Europe” 
101 Le Figaro “Nous voulons reconcilier la jeunesse avec l’Europe”, 28-08-2008  Surl'affirmation des 
normes européennes sur la scène internationale, je rejoins votre conviction que seule une démarche 
harmonisée au niveau européen est de nature à faire émerger pour demain des normes techniques qui 
soient un instrument d'influence décisif pour nos entreprises sur le marché mondial, Le Figaro “Nous 
voulons reconcilier la jeunesse avec l’Europe”;  L'affirmation des valeurs européennes face aux dérives 
du capitalisme passe également par une relance de la dynamique sociale à partir des propositions de la 
Commission sur un nouvel agenda social.28-08-2008. 
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financial and economic worsening and the ultimate crisis. Le Figaro again cites 
Jouyet who refers to the “inescapable partnership”102 with the UK and a long-term 
partnership with Germany.103 La Tribune at the end of the French presidency 
maintains approaches within EU to tackling economic crisis differ and states 
“important distortions exist between Anglo-Saxon and Franco-German economic 
approaches. If the first group aims at handling them carefully, the second target 
the enterprises and chooses to reduce production costs. This gives the plans a 
half-hearted boost104” La Tribune also  referrs to the Head of Robert Schuman 
Centre Jean-Dominique Giuliani, who maintains that the unforeseen events – the 
conflict in Georgia and the financial crisis – were “brilliantly handled” by  the 
 presidency and “constituted a chance for Nicolas Sarkozy to revive the French 
presidency”105  
 
5.3. Sampling 
The goal of the content analysis is to pursue  a systematic and objective 
description of the attributes of communication (Hostli p.127) to map 
causality.  These data will be used to make inferences about Presidency’s 
performance as determined certain normative or behavioura causes. Since 
research carried is limited to investigating the performance and self-
perception of two EU Council presidencies – German 2007 EU Presidency 
and French 2008 Presidency, the sampling of actors is evident.   Content 
anaysis is conducted on the newspaper articles, topically relevant to the 
subject of research and referent member states, official Presidency and 
government documentation and interviews. 
 
5.3.1. Sampling Sources  
 On the French Presidency: 
Le Figaro – is a widely popular newspaper in France, with circulation 
of  over 300.000.  The newspaper is said to have concervative ideology and 
has generally supported the Rally for the Republic political party, which 
transformed into the Union for a Popular Movement  
                                                                                                                                               
 
102 Le Figaro, 28-10-2008 ”… le Royaume-Uni est un partenaire incontournable” 
103 Ibid. “nous sommes engagés avec l'Allemagne dans une relation à long terme…” 
104 La Tribune, 19-12-2008, ”…des distorsions importantes existent entre les plans anglo-saxons et 
franco-allemands. Si les premiers visent les ménages, les seconds ont ciblé les entreprises en choisissant 
de réduire les coûts de production. Ce qui donne des plans de relance «unijambistes»…” “Unijambiste” 
here is used as a metaphor to denote  “not fully capable” or  “handicapped”. 
105 La Tribune, 19-12-2008 ”… Les événements internationaux ont constitué une chance pour Nicolas 
Sarkozy pour relancer la présidence française.” 
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 La Tribune- is a another popular newspaper with the main focus on 
financial issues.  
 
  Other sources:  
          French EU Council Presidency website 2008  
         German EU Council Presidency website 2007  
         Le Gouvernement Français (French Government) documents 
         Interviews 
According to Association for the Control of Media Diffusion 
(Association pour le contrôle de la diffusion de medias, OJD), the French 
press is often used as a tribune for political struggles.  The choice of the 
French media selected therefore portrays the diversity in and volume of 
critique, political preferences and variations in presidency performance 
perception. 
 
 On the German EU Presidency 
  
Die Deutsche Welle - “promotes understanding of Germany as an 
independent nation with its roots in European culture and as a liberal, 
democratic, constitutional state based on the rule of law.” It is also meant to 
"provide a forum in Europe and on other continents to German and other 
points of view on important issues, with the aim of fostering understanding 
and exchange between cultures and people.”106 
Süddeutschezeitung (SZ) – is the largest German newspaper published 
in Munich with readership of 1.1 million daily and a liberal editorial 
stance107.  
 German Bundestag documentation serves as an original resource centre 
and allows drawing reliable and relevant information on the German 
presidency.  
Other sources: 
The sampling table therefore looks the following way: 
Members Communication 
Sources 
Documentation 
Sources 
 
 
 
 
German 2007 EU 
Presidency 
Suddeutschezeitung (SZ) 
Deutsche Welle (DW) 
Bundestag 
documentation 
 
 
 
 
 
               
- 3 articles from SZ (in 
German), 6 articles 
from DW (in English), 
Declaration on the 
Occasion of the 
Fiftieth  Anniversary 
of the signature of the 
Treaties of Rome, - 
Presidency Working 
Programme, 
                                                                                                                                               
 
106 Die Deutsche Welle website (www.dw.de) 
107 Wikipedia 
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Interviews 
Presidency 
Conclusions 
- Ulrike Guerot, Senior 
Research Fellow and 
Head of the Berlin 
Office (ECFR);  Mr. 
Markus Broich, 
Verbindungsbüro 
Brüssel der SPD-
Fraktion im Deutschen 
Bundestag; German 
Embassy (Stockholm) 
– no quoting 
permitted; 
 
 
 
French 2008 EU 
Presidency 
Le Figaro 
 
La Tribune 
 
Documentation 
 
 
 
Interviews  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 articles from le 
Figaro (in French) 
3 articles from la 
Tribune  (in French), 
Presidency Working 
Programme, 
Presidency 
Conclusions 
- Mr. Laurent  
Delahousse, Senior 
Counselor, French 
Embassy in 
Washington D.C.; 
Guillaume Perron-
Piché, 
EuropeanSuppliers of 
Waste to Energy 
Technology (EU 
policy think tank)  
 
5.4. Interviews 
In the research I conducted semi-standardised interviews in English to 
try to reveal the subjective theory of the respondent about the causal 
relationship of self-perception and performance. The aim to unveil the 
“complex stock of knowledge” (Flick: 155) about Council Presidency 
performance, attitude towards Europe and possible causal attributes of it 
drove the type of questions I chose.    
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Question addressed to both German and French EU Presidencies: 
 
1)Chancellor Angela Merkel in her speech before the European Parliament on January 17, 
2007 said “Just as Europe has to redefine itself externally, so does it need to do internally”4. If you 
think of the German presidency in the EU, which activity (ies) of the German presidency 
corresponds to this conceptual framework (external and internal redefinition)?  
 
2) In your view, how do unforeseen events influence the performance of the EU presidency in 
general and the performance of the German/French presidency in particular (such as the failed 
referenda in France and the Netherlands/Irish rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, conflict in 
Georgia)?  
 
4) To what extent, do you think, Germany’s/France’s party politics affected the performance 
of the German/French Presidency in 2007/2008? 
 
5) In your view, how relevant is the size of the member-state in presidency performance and 
how does that relate to the idea in academic literature that a large part of the actual Presidency 
agenda is predetermined by on-going processes? 
 
The question on external and internal redefinition of the EU aimed to 
reveal what parties understand under these terms and whether the responses 
related or reflected in any way attitudinal aspects towards the European 
integration.  
 
The responses concerning the understanding of “ EU’s internal and external 
redefinition” focused on the revision of the Constitutional Treaty “to ensure 
capacity to act”. Both, German and French diplomats, however, had different 
referential objects for capacity. The German interviewees attributed this capacity 
to enlargement and a number of concrete goals that corresponded to Presidency 
priorities and included emission reduction goals of 20%, increased use of 
renewables, strengthening consumer protection as “internal redefinition” aspects. 
Externally, the German diplomat added strengthening CFSP, diplomatic efforts in 
the Middle East, European Strategy for Central Asia, EU-USA relations, opening 
new chapters in EU-Turkey and EU –Croatia negotiations.  The German 
interviewees mostly relied on the fulfilment of technical Presidency agenda 
(distinction was made between technical and crisis agenda) and projected a solid 
leader image of the German Presidency.  
The French interviewee referred to the French population as a yardstick for the 
French Presidency performance and stated “EU Presidency is routine, not 
something important for the French”. Both the German and the French 
interviewees placed attention on the personalities of the countries’ leaders- 
Merkel and Sarkozy, although with different semantic emphases. While the 
German interviewee stressed a big role of Angela Merkel in the constitutional 
matter stating she “saved the Treaty”, the French interviewee extensively referred  
to the President Sarkozy stating he was a “man of volonté”. As the interviewee 
did not elaborate on the meaning of “volonté”, it would be relevant to translate 
the word. The philosophical translation of the word suggests “volonté”108 is a set 
                                                                                                                                               
 
108 http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volont%C3%A9  
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of tendencies governed by the principle of rationality; legal definition suggests 
the term deals with “intentionality” while in psychology the terms deals with 
being capable to act voluntarily.   Such attribution indications are important here 
as they inform us about the foundations for self-perception.  
With regard to unforeseen events, the German and French interviewees 
approached answering the questions from different angles. The German 
respondent made explicit statements about the significant role played by 
unforeseen event, which affect agenda-shaping capability of the Presidency 
through the emergence of the so called “crisis agenda” in the Presidency 
timetable – the agenda that “should be based on the “pro-European intuition” of 
the Presidency. The French diplomat-respondent stated “there is no such thing as 
crisis agenda” The second German respondent stated unforeseen events “can and 
will always impact EU Presidency”.  Unforeseen events can be regarded as 
reaction-tests, checking a capacity of a Presidency to formulate an effective 
response to an unanticipated event. Whether reactions should be immediate like 
in the French 2008 case or protracted like in the German 2007 case doesn’t seem 
to play a significant role. Both, German and French respondents admitted the 
ability of respective Presidencies to come up with “hands-on approaches to EU” 
(French respondent) and “bring together differing positions concerning the vote in 
the Council on the Treaty” (German respondent) in times of crisis deserves 
mentioning.  
With regard to party politics, responces were only received from the German 
interviewees, which claimed party politics play a role in EU Presidency 
performance. SPD (German party ) party respondent stated SPD  “ was able to 
highly influence the programme and politics of the German Presidency. The SPD 
strongly promoted ambitious targets to  prevent climate change. Among others, 
these consisted of a 20% (a reduction of 30% if there will be a new global treaty 
signed in Copenhagen).  These targets were set on a Council meeting during the 
Council Presidency and were put into a concrete regulation within the climate 
change package in 2008. The second German respondent admitted “party politics 
matter for big countries”.  
As such, the size of a country emerges as a possible variable that may explain 
the Presidency’s functioning and behaviour. According to the French respondent, 
“size does not affect performance”. The French interviewee drew a parallel with 
the Luxembourg Presidency which “is traditionally excellent”. The French 
interviewee noted that “Presidency capacity…and attitude towards Europe” are 
more important than the size.  A more elaborate response was given by the 
German interviewee, who stated that “the Presidency of the Council requires a 
tremendous amount of resources and institutional capacity...the Permanent 
Representation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the European  Union in 
Brussels was enlarged during the Presidency. It does require for small country to 
invest more in building institutional capacity than a big country, which can 
already draw on existing resources.  Additionally it is probably easier for 
countries, which have been part of the EU for a long time than for those which 
are the “newcomers” in the Community. Nonetheless, a Presidency can also be a 
chance to set the agenda, promote new programs and guide the EU for small 
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Cause 
 Context & 
Intervening 
Condition 
countries, too.”  It is rather clear that ideational self-images of the Presidency are 
dependent on and responsive to various external and internal factors such as 
unexpected events, size, party preferences or vision of Europe. Cumulatively or 
individually these factors may lead to variations in performance.  
5.5. Coding and Categorising 
In coding, the main goal is to break down and understand a text and to attach and 
develop categories and put them in order. (Flick: 300) In order to illustrate and 
clarify relationships between categories I shall use a paradigm model (Strauss and 
Corbin 1998, p.127 in Flick: 301) and axial coding109. The model aims to “clarify 
the relations between a phenomenon, its causes and consequences, its context and 
strategies of those involved” (ibid.). The concepts included into the category are 
the phenomenon and for the context and conditions for other categories. The 
developed relations and categories are verified against the context and the data. 
(ibid.) 
 
The paradigm model is used to process the question of causality.  The 
developed categories are verified against the text and the data (Flick: 301). 
Categories of self-perception are drawn from academic literature on EU 
Presidencies (see Elgström 2003) and accumulate cause, context and strategy 
factors into a single category of self-perception. 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
109 Axial coding employs the use of inductive (developing concepts, categories and relations from the 
text) and deductive (testing the concepts, categories and relations against the text) thinking. (Flick: 301). 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1990, p.114) Axial coding is the process of relating subcategories to a 
category.  
Phenomenon 
(self-
perception)
Strategies 
Performance  
(Consequence) 
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Scheme 2. Paradigm Model for Coding and Categories  
 
 
Table.1 Explaining  the categories. 
German Presidency 
Cause Context & 
Intervening 
Condition 
Strategy Self-
perception 
Performance 
 
Expectation 
Revival of the 
Constitutional 
Treaty, 
Restoring 
Economic 
Dynamism 
Honest 
broker 
Broker dynamic 
French Presidency 
 
Reputation/ 
Credibility 
Irish 2008 
and French 
2005 
referenda, 
conflict in 
Georgia, 
financialcrisis 
Bargainer Ambiguous static 
 
 
5.6. Validity 
 
As  the aim of the analysis is to make inferences, diagnose and predict as to 
the effects of communication, my  goal here is to validate through 
“confirming” the sequence and repetition of themes in the text . This would 
also allow us to treat the analysis as “credible” or “referentially adequate”. 
As Eisner (1991) states, “we seek a confluence of evidence that breeds 
credibility, that allows us to feel confident about our observations, 
interpretations and conclusions.(Eisner 1991: 110)110 The approach 
employed by Eisner echoes Mishler’s (1990) process of “validation as the 
social construction of knowledge”, in which we evaluate “the 
trustworthiness  of reported observations, interpretations and generalizations 
(1990, p.419 in Flick 2006: 373). 
                                                                                                                                               
 
110 Eisner (1991) in Creswell, J. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, Choosing Among Five 
Approaches, SAGE, 2007. 
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The validity of the analysis is ensured by the universe from which samples 
were drawn. Holsti (1969) introduces content (face) validity, which in this 
case, is the most suitable form of revealing causality between self-
perception and performance. In descriptive research, content validity is 
sufficient to draw plausible results. Neuendorf (2002: 115) proposes to take 
a “WYSIWYG” (what you see is what you get) approach to face validity in 
content analysis. Based on this approach and the sample created, we may 
state the external validity (generalizability) of the analysis is moderate to 
high. The sample comprises identifiable representative actors, while content 
measurement, verified through interviews, is “true to life” (ibid.). Internal 
validity explains whether observed changes can be attributed to a specific 
cause and not to other possible causes111. Causal relationship between self-
perception and performance is extensively discussed in the literature on EU 
integration. Internal validity of the research may therefore be regarded as 
moderate or low as the cause-effect relationship is qualitatively approached 
on the basis of inferences and assumptions made of reality (Flick: 371).  
5.7. Reliability 
Procedural reliability (Flick: 369) as a type of reliability backed by theories 
on constructivism and historical institutionalism serves the purpose of 
content analysis the best as it allows to check the “dependability of data and 
procedures” (Flick: 371) on specific theoretical constructions.  Reliability 
with respect to the thesis is also founded on the stability of responses to a 
variety of norms and conditions outlined in standardised interviews. 
Reliability of the data collected can be regarded as high. Sources were 
identified to provide reliable first-hand information on the Presidency 
performance. To ensure reliability of information collected during the 
interviews, the sample comprised diplomats, party representative and think 
tanks representatives (see “Sampling”). The choice of media sources was 
verified both through online data published by Association for the Control 
of Media Diffusion (Association pour le contrôle de la diffusion de medias, 
OJD - for the French media) and a German-speaking  politically-conscious 
German national (for the German media). 
 
5.8. Summary 
                                                                                                                                               
 
111 http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/intval.php  
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The analysis was essentially based on descriptive, inferential and 
psychometric approaches, that is making inferences about Presidency self-
perception and performance based on process description, process 
categorisation and process-diagnosis. 
Content analysis and axial coding applied revealed two cause-forming 
categories for Council Presidency self-perception, - expectation and 
reputation/credibility.  Inference of  expectation were drawn from both, 
prior Eurobarometer surveys, which weren’t included into the content 
screening but datawise nevertheless affected the analysis, and media 
sources. 
By using descriptive, inferential and psychometric approaches, I was 
able to selectively describe certain situation factors that affected the 
behaviour of the Presidencies. Inferrential approach to content analysis was 
based on pointing out words or phrases, which inferred particular 
behavioural characteristics. The inferences were based on respective 
definitions of self-perception and performance.  The sampling of media and 
interviewees allowed to record relevant and reliable information to validate 
the research.  Interviews revealed divergence in ideational images for 
Presidency behaviour. While the German interviewees were prone to view 
the German Presidency in terms of “capacity to act”, following the rules and 
norms associated with being an “honest broker” (which corresponds to the 
dynamic performance), the French interviewee claimed “EU Presidency is a 
routine, not something important for the French” with the French media 
portraying the stance of the French Presidency on an individual issue as 
ambiguous.  There was an agreement, however, in viewing the roles of    
personalities of Merkel and Sarkozy as important in Presidency 
performance, though with emphasis placed different areas.  Various 
emphasis was placed on the role of the country’s size. While the French 
spokesman on behalf of the French Presidency stated the size does not  play 
a role (gave an example of the Luxembourg Presidenc), the German 
intervirewee stated that size does affect institutional resources and therefore 
performance and capability to act. Behaviour observation in content 
screening and their further validation through interviews allowed me to 
refer to the specific self-perception categories (derived from previous 
Presidency studies in academic literature) and generalise the type of self-
perception into broker and ambiguous, and performance- into static and 
dynamic.  
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6. Conclusions 
Studying EU Council Presidency is not new. Prior studies have been 
conducted and aim at studying the Presidency either as institutional 
constructs (Kirchner: 1992, Hayes-Renshaw: 1996) or through the lenses of 
empirical cases112 Theoretical accounts on the EU Council Presidency 
offered by Elgström (ed.: 2003) present an opportunity single out a specific 
phenomenon in the Council Presidency –Presidency performance. In the 
thesis I attempted to argue that institutions are constrained by both 
normative and historical factors, which affect Presidency self-perception, 
navigate the process and affect the outcome. Drawing on cognition-based 
hypothesis by Moskowitz (2005), I suggest that norms, goals, expectancies, 
culture, affect and needs can direct what we think we are, - in other words, 
our self-perception. On the other hand, the effects of self-perception on  
performance of the Presidency can be derived from the historical 
institutionalist argument that “institutional choices taken in the past persist, 
thereby shaping and constraining actors later in time.” (Wiener, Diez 2004: 
139)  
6.1. Presidencies’ performance from constructivist 
and historical institutionalist perspectives 
As constructivists largely refer to norms and roles to explain performance, 
the cases of the French and German EU presidencies indicate at diverging 
ways of norm application.  The norm of impartiality is linked to the quality 
of leadership, which in its turn is determined by the quality of mediation. 
The norm of effectiveness is linked to the ability of the Presidency to 
achieve ‘achieve efficient and favourable outcomes, which have the desired 
impact’ (see Underdal 1994 in Metcalfe 1998). Both norms exist within 
Presidency performance as contextual signifiers and are linked to eventual 
type of role and strategy a Presidency chooses to apply these norms. From 
constructivist point of view role and strategy choices as behavioural choices 
are dependent on norms as defining not so much what a presidencies wants 
                                                                                                                                               
 
112 See Mayhew, Alan and Quaglia, Lucia, Working Paper 97, 2007; See the briefing notes and reports in, for 
example, the Journal of Common Market Studies Annual Review, Notre Europe, Centre for European Policy Studies 
for more evidence of this. 
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to achieve (the agenda is pre-determined), but how and with what effect on 
the Presidency image and performance.  
  In negotiations on climate change, the French Presidency was preoccupied 
with “reinforcing its driving role and credibility”(Lequesne, SIEPS Report 
2008) and came out as “uncertain” over the type of performance it 
ultimately exhibited.  In immigration domain, French Presidency is 
regarded to have exhibited self-interested, yet efficient behaviour.  
According to CEPS finding113, “the explicit intergovernmental nature of the 
Pact questions the intention of building a common European policy on 
migration. The Pact is very much oriented towards the member states and is 
driven by a predominately intergovernmental logic prioritising the 
competences of the member states over those of an EU at 27”. 
The German Presidency’s willingness to act as “an honest broker” on 
Constitutional negotiations and the French Presidency ambition to regain 
credibility in climate change negotiations illustrate that intention emerges as 
a factor structuring the behaviour of the Presidency. According to March 
and Olsen (1995, p.65) behaviour belongs to the part of a system of values, 
goals and attitudes that embeds intentions into the structure of other beliefs 
and aspirations. Intentions as prerequisites for behaviour are determined by 
what Habermas (1992: 432 in Fossum et.al 2009) calls “the streams of 
communicating information and points of view” – a public sphere, which, 
according to the logic of appropriateness, extrapolates the images and 
determines potential behaviours and roles of the Council Presidency 
through perceived anticipated value to be obtained by the Presidency in 
individual policy sectors. Expectations influence self-perception as a factor 
that tests reaction capability of the Presidency to a specific social, political 
or economic stimulus. Based on the reaction exhibited, a particular 
attribution was made about the Presidency’s capability and ideational 
image.  
In the performance of the German and French EU Council presidencies 
historical institutionalist patterns were visible the most in areas where actors 
tried to adopt behavioural patterns exercised by the governments of the 
respective presidencies. The historical institutionalist argument, however, 
has not fully proved its validity in the French Presidency case of 
approaching security and defence policy. Sarkozy’s unequivocal support for 
the idea of bringing France back into the NATO structures and the idea to 
strengthen EU-NATO partnership on the principle of complimentarity do 
testify to the willingess of the French Presidency to base its performance on 
real-time needs and priorities.  
Tasks a Presidency traditionally performs relate to the logic of 
appropriateness insofar as “presidencies act as they believe they should act” 
(Elgström 2003: 198). The logics of action chosen may serve to describe, 
explain, justify and criticize  behaviour.  According to March and Olsen 
                                                                                                                                               
 
113 CEPS Policy Paper No.170 by Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild, Septembre 2008 
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(04/09), behavioural mechanisms are history-dependent processes of 
adaptation . Rule-driven behaviours associated with successes, March 
states, are likely to be repeated, while rules associated with failures are not 
(March 04/09). This explains why self-perception rests predominately on  
an assumption that history-dependent processes play a role in determining 
the behavioural paths Presidencies choose and why successfully integrated 
behaviour is applied to performance. 
 
 
 
 
  49
6. References 
Books: 
Bererlson, Bernard 1971, Content Analysis in Communicative Research,       
Hafner, New York 
 
  Creswell, John W., 2007 Qualitative inquiry and research design. Choosing        
among five approaches, SAGE. 
         Cini, Michelle (ed.), Bourne, Angela K. (ed.), 2006 Palgrave Advances in  
 European Union Studies, Palgrave Macmillian 
 Cooper, John, Heron Timothy 1998, Applied Behaviour Analysis, 2nd ed., 
Pearson 
Diez, Thomas and Wiener, Antje 2004 European Integration  Theory, 
Oxford University Press. 
          Elgsröm, Ole, 2003 European Union Council Presidencies.  A comparative  
 perspective, Routledge 
Fossum, John Erik (ed.), Schlesinger, Philip, 2007 The European Union and 
the Public Sphere: a Communicative Space in the Making?, 
Routeledge, New York 
Flick, Uwe, 2006 An introduction to Qualitative Research, SAGE 
Holsti, Ole, 1969 Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities,             
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company 
Hayes.Renshaw, Fiona, Wallace, Helen, 2006 The Council of Ministers,  
 Basingstoke Macmillian 
Kirchner, Emil Joseph, 1992 Decision Making in the European Community. 
The Council Presidency and European Integration, Manchester 
University       Press. 
Moskowitz, Gordon, 2005 Social Cognition. Understanding Self and       
  Others, Guilford Press, New York 
March, James G. 1989 Rediscovering institutions: the organisational basis 
of politics, New York: Free Press 
Neuendorf, Kimberly A, 2002 The Content Analysis Guidebook, SAGE 
Stålfors, Sebastian 2008, Political institutions and Government         
    Performance, Örebro University 
Articles and Statistics 
  
Berlin Declaration, www.eu2007.de 
Bundestag  (Federal Government) of Germany: Taking Stock of the German 
EU Presidency, 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Homepage/home.h
tml 
  50
Brussels European Council, French Presidency Conclusion, 13 February 
2009-05-18 
Brussels European Council, German Presidency Conclusion, 20 July, 2007 
 
Checkel, Jeoffrey Constructivist approachest to European Integration, 2006, 
Working Paper  No.6, ARENA, Oslo 
Eurobarometer 68, Autumn 2007, National Report, Germany  
 
Eurobarometer 69, Spring 2008, National Report, France  
EU Presidency Working Programme, Federal Government, 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/EN/Europe/europe.ht
ml 
Elgström, Ole and Jonsson, Christian Negotiations in the European Union: 
Bargaining or Problem-solving? Journal of European Public Policy 
7:5, Special issue 684-704, Routledge 
Elgström, Ole, Tallberg, Jonas Silencer or Amplifier?     The European 
Union Presidency and the Nordic Countries, Volume 27- No.3, 
2004 
Henk, William, Melnik, Steven The Reader Self-Perception Scale: A new 
tool to measuring how children feel about themselves as readers, 
http://faculty.rcoe.appstate.edu/koppenhaverd/hardinpark/RSPS.pd
f  
Kurpas, Sebastien, Riecke, Henning The 2007 German EU Presidency: a 
Midterm Report 2007:1op, SIEPS 
Lequesne, Christian and Rozenberg, Olivier The French Presidency of 2008. 
The Unexpected Agenda, SIEPS 2008: 3op. 
Manners, Ian in Elgström (ed.) The British Presidency of 1998. New 
Labour, new  tone? Pp.87-103, 2003, Routledge. 
Mayhew, Alan; Quaglia, Lucia and Hough, Dan “ You can’t always get 
what you want but do you sometimes get what you need? The 
German Presidency of the EU in 2007, Working Paper  97, Sussex 
European Institute 
Moravcsik, Andrew De Gaulle and European Integratino: Historical 
Revision and Social Science Theory, 1998 Working Paper Series 
8.5, Centre for European Studies 
Moravcsik, Andrew A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and 
International Cooperation, 1999, pp. 267-306, MIT Press. 
Metcalfe, David 1998 Leadership in European Union Negotiations: the 
Presidency of the Council, Kluwer International 3: 413-434 
Risse, Thomas “Let’s Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics”, 
Research Paper 
Tallberg, Jonas The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and 
Distribution in EU negotiations, JCMS, 2004, vol.42, No.5, 
pp.999-1022 
 
 
